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ABSTRACT
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION
DURING HURRICANE KATRINA
by Rebecca Nell Woodrick
May 2009

This study analyzed an educational organization's crisis communication with its
employees regarding the devastation caused to the organization and to employees by
hurricane Katrina in 2005. This study drew upon literature regarding communication in
crisis and in particular, natural disaster crisis, to ascertain to what degree employees felt
the organization engaged in characteristics of High Reliability Organizations. A case
study approach employing both qualitative and quantitative data was utilized.
The data revealed that the organization was perceived by employees has having
adequately communicated before and after Katrina. Data further revealed that the
organization engages in behaviors consistent with practices of High Reliability
Organizations. This study was designed to add to a limited body of knowledge regarding
effective crisis communication practices of employers with employees during natural
disasters.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Organizations depend on communication for survival. It is not a far reach to
describe communication as the lifeblood of an organization. The day-to-day operation of
an organization, whether for-profit or not-for-profit in nature, depends upon a constant
flow of effective communicative interactions from employee to customer, employee to
employee, organization to the public, and in numerous other dyads which further
illustrate the necessity to communicate effectively within an organization. How
communication occurs outside the confines of the day-to-day routine becomes of
paramount importance to the organization's survival when crisis occurs. What is
communicated during and after a crisis, and to whom, can determine whether or not the
organization survives, and if so, whether or not it will be perceived as viable, post-crisis.
Organizations experience crisis in multiple forms. In the most general terms,
organizations encounter crises in the same ways as individuals: crises which are a
function of human behavior, or crises that are a function of nature, the "act of God"
variety. Within these very broad categories one finds a plethora of types: man-made
crises that are a function of human mental error, for example, or man-made crises created
as an act of deliberate harm. What distinguishes natural disasters from man-made
disasters? Further, what difference does such a distinction make to an organization? An
understanding of the basic differences is key as one analyzes communication in times of
crisis.
In the most general terms, disasters arise from events of an environmental nature
- i.e., acts of God - whereas crises are based in human error combined with outside
influences, whether of the physical or social environment. Kreps (1984) provided a
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sociological basis for teasing out these nuances when he suggested that disasters are
community-based events that, as a ripple effect, in turn create crises in organizations that
comprise the community. For example, an earthquake creates disaster in a town.
Organizations that must respond to that disaster, in turn, experience crisis as a response.
They must respond to what is created when disaster meets design: the natural event
informs the design which the organization has created to enact a response. This
sociological perspective implies a distinction between disaster as an event-of-nature
which spawns crises within organizations, whether organization is perceived as an
incorporated community, a disaster response entity, or a for-profit corporation.
Quarantelli (1988) distinguished natural disaster from organizational disaster when he
categorized natural disasters as collective stress situations that have community-wide
impact, with community serving as a sociological term akin to Kreps'. In other words,
like Kreps, Quarantelli's research focused on the need to examine organizational
response to community disaster. Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (1998) further delineated
natural disaster from man-made disaster by reframing organizational disaster as
organizational crisis, based on the assumption that natural disasters are a function of
nature's hand, so to speak, not human hand.
The nature of a natural disaster-created crisis varies in significant ways from
crises created as an outgrowth of human behavior. In most basic terms, natural disaster
crises are uncontrollable. Humans do not possess the capacity to control Hurricanes,
floods, tornados, or earthquakes. Humans - organizations - can only control response to
such. An organization in crisis due to a natural disaster must negotiate a unique set of
challenges, and must, do so in a way that will provide the greatest chance for
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organizational survival. In the wake of natural disaster-related crises, the very survival of
one's employment force takes on paramount importance.
Within organizations, then, the way in which the crisis is addressed will be
significantly informed by the man-made or act-of-God nature of the crisis. This research
project explores the communicative challenges an organizations faces during natural
disaster crisis, to what degree significant differences exist in response types in this
circumstance, and how organizations may most effectively communicate with members
during times of natural disaster crises. Additionally, this study will apply the High
Reliability Organization perception scale to an organization that survived a natural
disaster crisis, to ascertain the degree to which crisis communication affects employee
perceptions of efficacy and reliability.
On August 29, 2005, category 5 Hurricane Katrina hit the United States Gulf
Coast, with the brunt of its force hitting the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana. The President's Report on the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina
(Townsend, 2006) provided details that help capture the enormity of the disaster. By the
time the Hurricane was downgraded to lower levels of intensity, then to tropical storm
status and finally into floods and tornados, 1,300 people had lost their lives. Beyond the
loss of life, entire communities disappeared, levees in New Orleans, Louisiana broke and
flooded the entire Ninth Ward district, and economic devastation reached the billion
dollar mark. The scope of life, property, and economic loss continues to be assessed.
Explanations regarding why Hurricane Katrina exacted such a high cost in human
life and livelihood likely will be debated for years to come, with blame assigned and yet
culpability never fully determined. Historians will analyze what factors led to tangible
and psychological inadequacies that rendered hundreds of thousands of citizens helpless
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in the face of the natural disaster that was Katrina. However, what is not debatable, but
simply stands on fact, is the magnitude and scope of the Hurricane itself.
Hurricane Katrina packed winds of up to 130 miles per hour, created wind surges
of 27 feet, and ultimately impacted square footage roughly the size of Great Britain. In
Mississippi alone, almost 80 miles of coastal property were destroyed. The resulting
floods and wind damage caused a loss of life in the greater New Orleans metropolitan
area of approximately 1,100 lives. Of the 1,100 killed, the vast majority consisted of the
elderly, the infirm, and the poor. Beyond the approximately 1,100 persons known to
have died as a result of Hurricane Katrina, as of 18 months after Katrina hit,
approximately 2,000 people from the Gulf Coast were still reported as missing. This
almost incomprehensible scope of destruction made Katrina, de facto, the most
destructive natural disaster in United States history (Townsend, 2006).
The chaos caused by Hurricane Katrina was not limited to loss of human life and
of geographical destruction. All communication systems across the three states most
heavily affected were virtually destroyed or incapacitated for multiple days, even weeks.
Thirty-eight 911 emergency call centers, along with three million telephone customers'
land lines, were rendered useless by the Hurricane. Cell phone service proved to be
sporadic at best; television communication was likewise compromised. Subsequently,
usual avenues of communication were rendered useless. Therefore, for those business
organizations in the geographical region affected by Katrina that did survive,
implementation of effective crisis communication became essential for viability.
Statistics regarding Hurricane Katrina's impact on the economy of the Gulf Coast
reflected devastation almost beyond comprehension. Mississippi and Louisiana clearly
sustained the worst economic blows. The Brookings Institute, one year after Katrina,
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confirmed that basic infrastructures necessary to conduct business were obliterated (Katz,
Fellowes, & Mabanta, 2006). Almost 30 miles of vital business route U;S. Highway 90
along the Mississippi Gulf Coast was destroyed. Bridges that once connected the
business communities of Biloxi to Ocean Springs, and Pass Christian to Bay St. Louis
were destroyed (Gulf Coast Business Council, 2007). In New Orleans, the Interstate 10
bridge between Slidell and New Orleans, a vital traffic link for surrounding states and for
suburban communities into New Orleans, collapsed. Additionally, for an extended period
of time, only emergency vehicles could access the Lake Ponchartrain Causeway.
According to statistics gleaned from the President's "Lessons Learned" team and
from The Institute for Southern Studies (Kromm, 2006), Hurricane Katrina's blow to the
economic viability of the Gulf Coast region took the following forms:
®

Destroyed or left uninhabitable 300,000 homes;

•

Created an overall estimate of damage totaling $200 billion;

•

Created a drastic increase in unemployment rates in Louisiana and
Mississippi, from 6% pre-Katrina to 12% immediately after Katrina;

•

Along the Gulf Coast, caused a drop in wages earned by an estimated $1.2
billion in the third quarter alone of 2005.

The concept of "lessons learned" from Katrina applied to all facets of life and
livelihood. Katrina provided the opportunity for virtually every academic discipline of
scholars to assess and adjust as needed. When one considers the various ways in which
Hurricane Katrina impacted the Gulf Coast, the painfully obvious common element is
lack of viable communicative resources. Residents no longer had electricity to access
key forms of communication, nor roads to travel to work, nor a physical location to
which to return to work. Within the context of this new reality, the academic discipline
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of organizational communication had the opportunity to learn lessons. Absent the usual
avenues of communication, how did organizations attempt communication, how effective
were those attempts, and what forms of organization communication occurred that
heretofore had not been used? Scholars of organizational communication may discern
that an outgrowth of Hurricane Katrina is the opportunity to study communicative
endeavors, running the gamut from confirming the efficacy of standard practices to
charting new methods that arose from necessity.
Organizations typically identify a variety of groups as stakeholders: customers,
the general public, shareholders, and employees. The form of communication most
effective for each of these constituencies may vary in times of crisis. The nature of the
crisis will inform what kind of crisis communication should (or can) be accessed.
Coombs (1999), for example, illustrated the way in which crisis type drives the decision
about how, and to whom, communication will be disseminated. Coombs generalized
organizational crisis type into the two categories of man-made and natural disaster. His
typology of man-made crises, however, included eight specific areas: malevolence,
technical breakdowns, human breakdowns, challenges, mega damage, organizational
misdeeds, workplace violence, and rumors. Within the realm of these eight typologies,
much research exists in the area of effective crisis communication with each of the
constituencies identified above, save one: communication with employees. What
distinguishes natural disasters from man-made disasters? Further, what difference does
such a distinction make? An understanding of the basic differences is key as one
analyzes communication in times of crisis. In the most general terms, disasters arise from
events of an environmental nature - i.e., acts of God - whereas crises are based in human
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A dearth of information exists across the significant areas of scholarly research
regarding effective crisis communication with employees in times of natural disasterrelated crises. The areas of scholarly research that lack extensive employee crisis
communication studies include communication studies, organizational management,
public relations, and to some degree, psychology and counseling. Most recently,
however, in a post-9/11 world, scholarly research has renewed its interest in, and analysis
of, the "what, why, when and how" of communication with employees in times of crisis,
whether man-made or of the "act of God" variety. While some differences do exist
between effective communication with employees in the wake of natural or man-made
disasters, the depth of research on employee communication in times of natural disasters
is shallow. An explanation of what we do know about employee communication in the
wake of man-made disaster and how that knowledge is applicable to natural disaster
communication is explored in the next chapter. However, this research projects will
focus only on key aspects of communication with employees around the event of a
natural disaster-induced organizational crisis. In doing so, the expectation is that we will
gain insight into what man-made crisis communication is applicable to nature disaster
communication, as well as discover what forms of communication with employees may
be uniquely useful for natural disasters.
The purpose of this study is to determine how a higher education organization in
the Katrina-affected area was perceived by its employees as having engaged in
communication with them around the crisis created by Hurricane Katrina. This study will
further determine to what degree employees of the organization perceived it to be a High
Reliability Organization (HRO) in the wake of a natural disaster-induced critical incident.
An HRO is defined as one that operates in a continual high-risk environment, yet does so
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with minimal crisis interruption (Weick, 1988). Organizations that conduct business with
mindfulness of crisis provide a measure against which less risk-prone organizations can
be studied. More specifically, HRO's provide a basis for identifying best practices for
low-risk organizations that find themselves in crisis through not fault of their own. The
degree to which an organization's employees may perceive it as operating in a state of
high reliability may base that perception, in part, on communicative efforts. This
research project seeks to determine if such a correlation exists. Finally, this study will
determine what factors lead employees to perceive their employer as having successfully
engaged in organizational learning in the context of a natural disaster- induced critical
incident.
The degree to which organizations can learn survival strategies that include
effective communication with employees holds the potential for economic impact for the
inevitable future natural disaster crises which the United States and other countries will
face. Such organizations can serve as a model for other organizations striving to engage
in organizational learning. This study will add to the limited body of knowledge
regarding how and why an organization that was directly affected by Hurricane Katrina
was able to remain functional, and to what degree - and how - they communicated with
employees, post-crisis. Information gleaned from this study will provide a perspective by
which to assess efficacy of current models of crisis communication, and potentially
expand upon current research on intraorganizational communication in organizational,
crisis, and business management communication field.
The study employs a case study approach using a mixed method quantitative and
qualitative research approach that blends results of focus groups and a written survey. A
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detailed analysis of the viability of a mixed method research approach is provided in
Chapter 3. The following research questions provide the basis for the study's direction:
RQ1 a: How do employees characterize their organization's communication in
response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on length of employment with the
organization?
RQlb: How do employees characterize their organization's communication in
response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on employee work location in relation
to the disaster?
RQlc: How do employees characterize their organization's communication in
response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on pay type?
RQ2: To what degree do employees perceive their employing organization to be
an HRO in the aftermath of a natural disaster-induced

crisis?

RQ3a: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on length of employment with the organization?
RQ3b: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on employee work location in relation to the disaster?
RQ3c: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on salaried or hourly employment

status?

The following chapter details the theoretical basis for the research. Chapter 3
describes the methods by which responses to the questions will be gathered and analyzed.
Chapter 4 will systematically present the results of this study, and Chapter 5 includes
discussion of their implications for the field.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This section summarizes the history of crisis communication study within the
academic realm of organizational communication. In doing so, it explicates several
major theories of crisis communication in particular. Additionally, this chapter provides
a summary of what scholars in the study of crisis communication have determined
regarding organizational communication with employees during and immediately after a
natural disaster-related crisis occurs. Two theories in particular related to organizational
crisis communication are identified and explained in terms of natural-disaster crises:
High Reliability Organization (HRO) practices, and Organizational Learning. HRO and
Organizational Learning theory both provide a framework from which employer crisis
communication with employees can be assessed for success and adaptability for other
organizations. Organizational learning theory provides a basis for determining
employees' perceptions of a values-based renewal of the organization. Organizational
learning as a theory is an overarching context in which events in the life of an
organization can be assessed, analyzed and from which adaptations to operation can be
based. Organization learning theory is not limited to analysis of crisis events only; t is
provides a context in which any event can be viewed. It is, however, a particularly useful
theory to apply to organizations that have experienced crisis, whether man made or not.
In the situation in which an organization has experienced crisis and remained viable,
organizational learning theory provides the framework for analysis that instructs what
that organization is, and what it might become. The High Reliability Organization scale,
in particular, becomes a means by which organization learning occurs, within the context
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of internal perception. The HRO provides one set of lens through which analysis of the
degree of organizational learning can be assessed. An HRO is, by definition, an
organization that engages in active learning. The link between learning and mindfulness
in an HRO is a strong and deliberate one. Because by its very nature an HRO engages in
learning, the HRO scale helps determine to what degree another organization is a learning
one. Specifically, what is learned about how employee communication was received,
both literally and perceptually, can be compared using practices of an HRO that have
articulated into scale form, for the purpose of providing comparison. It provides an
avenue by which an organization can determine if application of organizational learning
theory produces anticipated results.
Organizational communication with employees, both in times of crisis and
otherwise, occurs in a variety of forms. The nature of the organization typically dictates
the various channels utilized for communication. Formal internal channels of
communication may include oral communication such as individual interactions,
subgroup meetings, or organization-wide settings. Formal internal communication in
written form often appears in memos, newsletters, emails, and letters. Paralleling formal
communicative channels are the informal methods of intraorganizational communication.
Information disseminated orally in social settings, individual discussions, as well as
informal written channels, can impact organizational actions just as formal methods do.
Informal channels, in fact, may serve as a more prevalent and powerful means of
communication than more formal channels can, particularly in moments of crisis.
Beyond the confines of the organization, communication channels such as media access,
telephone service, and general public word-of-mouth can potentially impact, both
positively and negatively, how organizations channel information to employees, and with
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what degree of success. The nature of a crisis, therefore, often requires that an
organization utilize communication channels not ordinarily used with employees. The
need to access formal and informal communication channels, both internally and
externally to the organization, will likely require flexibility and creativity when
communicating with employees in times of crisis.
Crisis Communication Defined
How can an organization determine when it is in crisis? What does it mean to
engage in crisis communication as opposed to other forms of intra- and interorganizational communication? One of the earliest scholars to combine the concept of
crisis with communication is C. F. Hermann, who, as a doctoral candidate in
Northwestern University's political science program, identified the phenomenon of crisis
in organization with a communicative response (1963). He offered a definition of
organizational crisis in which an action of some type, either internal or external to the
organization, threatens the identifying values of the organization, presents a restricted
amount of time to respond to it, and is unexpected by the organization. This seminal
definition of an organizational crisis is crucial because it speaks to three key components
of crisis: threat, restricted response time, and the element of surprise. While subsequent
research has reshaped this definition to parse out important nuances, these three
components remain basic to the shared definition of crisis even today.
The roots of crisis communication within the discipline of speech communication
are found in the traditions of apologia. Apologia was the earliest form of crisis
communication. As a distinct rhetorical genre it began with Socrates and the Greek
culture's belief in the right of a male citizen to address his accusers in defense of self.
Ware and Linkugel (1973) argued that this public defense evolved over time into a
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recognizable type of public address, one consisting of predictable phases of accusation
followed by advocacy of one's reputation. Verbal self-defense within the parameter of
apologia became the basis of political genre that even recently, scholars recognize as
classic apologia. Contemporary politicians even today engage in the types of apologia
that Ware and Linkugel identified: denial, bolstering, differential, and transcendence.
Denial involves an attempt to simply dissuade one's audience from the belief of
guilt or responsibility. Often the "sell" of denial hinges upon the concept of intent—
whether or not an action was taken is not necessarily called into question. What is
challenged, however, is the motive, if one even existed. Bolstering, on the other hand, is
the strategy used by the accused to reinforce a perceived positive commonality with one's
audience, in an attempt to deflect from the action in question. Effective bolstering
requires the audience to soften its judgment against the accused, based on that feeling of a
common bond, heritage, or background. Differential apologia employs a subtle but
distinct difference in approach from bolstering, in that differential apologia, in essence,
asks the audience to suspend judgment until the action in question can be considered in a
context. Like bolstering, the accused is not asking his audience to ignore the action, but
to reconsider in light of a commonality (bolstering) or a particular perspective
(differentiation). Transcendence, as well, does not ask the audience to ignore what has
occurred, but to place the event into the context of a larger setting in which the particulars
of the event lose power. Transcendence as a form of apologia is often used as a means of
inviting the audience to see the indictment against one's self as an indictment of a larger
societal idea, norm, or behavior. Hence, the guilt of the accused may be softened in light
of a perceived attack upon a broader scope, be it a concept or a community.
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Downey (1993) suggested that a pivotal moment for apologia as a rhetorical
device occurred in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, with the advent of mass
media and its influence on American culture, thought, and opinion. This new era created
a larger stage for individuals to take their case, as it were, to a larger court of public
opinion. In this process, Downey asserts, apologia further developed into yet a more
refined form of self-defense. This form which emerged included two key alterations: the
concept of full disclosure as a means to merely reframe events, and outright avoidance of
any responsibility for the event in question. The latter strategy, in particular, is
predicated upon the assumption that "the less said, the better." In other words, minimal
explanation may lead to minimal discussion.
Against this background of apologia as a distinct genre within the speech
communication discipline, the field of communication studies owes a debt to scholars in
other academic areas for initial research on the concept of crisis communication. Much
of the literature devoted to this topic is gleaned from research in the disciplines of
organizational management and public relations. These two disciplines transferred the
concept of personal accountability, a la apologia, to the realm of organizational
communication. Only within the past two decades that scholars readily identifiable with
traditional programs of communication studies have emerged as leaders in the field of
crisis communication research.
One finds, for instance, that the "grandfather" of crisis communication as a field
of study hails from a business management academic background. 1.1. Mitroff first
began publishing on the concept of effective crisis management in the late 1980s.
Because of his business management perspective, his research focuses primarily on the
corporate communicative response to crisis. His definition of a crisis reflects how 25
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years of corporate development significantly refined Hermann's earlier, more simplistic
definition. Specifically, Mitroff and his colleagues Shrivastava and Udwadia (1987)
identified a crisis as disasters that are precipitated by people, organizational structures,
economics, or technology that cause extensive damage to human life and/or to social
environments.
Of note is the significant addition of the elements of technology and of social
environment. Mitroff and his colleagues are credited with the development of the
systems approach to crisis management in organizations (Mitroff, Pauchant, &
Shrivastava, 1998). Crisis researchers perceive this theory as one of the defining ones of
the field. Mitroff defined the corporate crisis as a normal event within the organization
which collides with the complexity of the organization and with human error, creating a
significant threat to the goals of the organization. By normal, Mitroff and his colleagues
see crisis as an inevitable and often helpful evolution of an organization. While
unwelcome, an organizational crisis highlights weaknesses of the organization, forces
error correction and ultimately identifies the group's strengths, both in systemic and
human resource terms.
Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (1998) define organizational crisis as "a specific,
unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of events which create
high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization's high priority
goals" (p. 233). This definition encompasses the danger to the organization's viability,
coupled with an extraordinary loss of control.
As Mitroff was applying a systems approach to crisis communication, Karl E.
Weick was applying his theory of enacted sensemaking (1988). This approach suggests
that if an organization is to respond appropriately to crisis and in turn provide appropriate
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communication around the crisis, the organization must analyze the crisis through a
sensemaking view. Crises, according to Weick, are defined as events with low probability
but high consequences that threaten the viability of the organization. This view interprets
the crisis event from a premise that people enact the environments that constrain them. In
the context of crisis, this perspective suggests that once the event has occurred, the
emerging sensemaking that people around the crisis make of it should be the determining
factor in how the organization shapes its subsequent communication. This theory
assumes that a systems approach to the crisis would not become evident until those
affected by the crisis have formed their own context for the crisis. In short, the
organization cannot anticipate what events will be born, so to speak, as a result of the
events that people themselves set into motion as a result of the crisis itself. Actions in
crisis, maintains Weick, are always a little further along than an understanding of the
crisis. This perspective does not suggest that the organization, then, is impotent to
respond in times of crisis. Rather, it asserts that the most effective communication will
be based on response to how those persons involved in the crisis make sense of the crisis'
influence on them and the organization.
Theories of Crisis Management
In the mid-1990s, a new theory of managing crisis through effective
communication emerged in the form of impression management strategies as defined by
Allen and Caillouet (1994). Their research marks the emergence of crisis communication
as a field of specialization in traditional communications academic scholarly journals.
Impression management strategy posits that corporations, when in crisis, become actors
that consciously engage in strategic communication that will acknowledge and address
the complexity of communication required for appropriate response. Crisis within

17
organizations requires communication that reinforces the legitimacy of the organization.
This legitimacy is established through apology, ingratiation, excuses, or justification.
This theory and these categories build upon the research of Ware and Linkugel (1973)
which addressed verbal defense in political discourse. Their categories, in turn, emerged
from Socrates' theory of apologia. Allen and Caillouet have further expanded the verbal
defense concept to categorize organizational response to crisis. Each of these strategies
takes one of two forms: an attempt to absolve the actor by the challenger, or an attempt
to invoke only a mild rebuke and strong forgiveness from the challenger. Apology,
justification, and excuses fall into the first category and openly admit fault. Allen and
Caillouet indicate that the most effective form of impression management involves
ingratiation. They define ingratiation as the attempt to minimize the damage of the crisis
on the organization by emphasizing the positive qualities, traits, and actions of the
organization. The organizational actor thereby re-establishes those characteristics their
constituents perceived as positive about the organization prior to the crisis. Ingratiation
involves a reframing of the event to emphasize the organization's conformity with normal
expectations — of behavior or standards - that a first reading of the situation would offer.
This approach can legitimately be defined as the precursor to the concept of damage
control or spin control in organizational communication.
Benoit (1995) established the basis for organizational image restoration discourse
when he analyzed the restorative strategies of public persons who had suffered some
form of reputation damage. He worked from the premise that human beings, by nature,
work hard to reduce or repair real or perceived damage to self-image. Benoit further
refined apologia by suggesting that not only is it human nature to protect one's public
image, doing so actually occurs inevitably. This inevitable protection of reputation is
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based upon four realities. Benoit asserts that modern humans work in a highly
competitive environment, one that invites constant analysis of usefulness of people,
products or ideas. Any perceived slight to one's reputation, then, could cause an
immediate drop in one's public stature. For example, a misstep by a politician can cause
an immediate drop in public opinion polls. Additionally, events beyond one's control
often occur that cause a blow to one's reputation. A missed deadline at work may be a
function of malfunctioning computer systems, but the effect on one's professional
reputation may be damaging anyway. Further, a negative change in image can occur
simply because one is human, and humans make mistakes (an alarm clock does not ring
because it was not set to go off, a meeting is missed, and an image of punctuality is
damaged). Finally, Benoit suggests that basic human nature pulls us toward image
restoration because, as individuals in a multicultural, pluralistic society, differences of
opinion over priorities, values, and goals may hinder reputations. Individuals sharing
work space may make assumptions about a co-worker's belief system that are based on
inaccurate information, but the end result is still a diminished reputation.
Benoit (1995) suggested that to effectively incorporate this theory, one must
accept two components to a complaint: that the accused is held responsible for the attack,
fairly or not; and the action which caused the complaint is considered offensive by the
accuser. Image restoration theory is concerned only with message options to crisis. In
legitimate ways, Benoit's theory can be perceived as a revision of attribution theory in
the context of crisis communication as described by Coombs. For example, image
restoration strategy employs strategies similar to attribution theory: denial, evasion of
responsibility; reducing offensiveness of the event; corrective action; and mortification.
One key difference, however, is that image restoration discourse strategy is concerned
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less with the context in which the crisis occurs than is Coombs' use of attribution theory.
A detailed explanation of Coombs' attribution theory, and the role of context in his use of
the theory, is discussed shortly.
In 1997, Benoit expanded upon the theory of image restoration as a way for
organizations to approach their response strategies in times of crisis. The basic human
desire to protect self-image parallels an organization's basic need to create, maintain,
and, when necessary, restore positive public image. One key difference between
individual and organizational image restoration, however, is the amount of financial,
legal, and other types of resources that can typically be invested in the process of
organizational crisis response. And, though image restoration remains the goal, the
organization may find that more audiences must be considered in image restoration than
an individual may face. A corporation, as an example, may have image restoration issues
in the face of crisis that involve the general public, stockholders, and employees. Image
restoration may well involve key nuances in message content to each distinct group.
Another theory emerged in the mid-1990s regarding how an organization should
communicatively respond to a crisis, this time with distinct emphasis on how the public's
perception of the organization can be shaped, post-crisis. This emphasis concerns itself
almost not at all with internal response to the crisis, and expands its concept of response
past stockholders to include the general public at large. Coombs (1995) proposed a
theory of crisis response based on attribution theory. Attribution theory asserts people
feel a need to judge an event in terms of locus, stability, and controllability. Stated
another way, the public will want to judge or determine if the organization in crisis
brought it upon itself through an internal weakness, or if an external force was at play.
Second, attribution theory in crisis management requires that the organization address the
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stability factor (i.e., if the cause of the crisis is a one-time occurrence or is a constant
presence). Third, this theory suggests the public will want to know to what degree, if
any, the organization can control the crisis-inducing event.
Coombs (1995) expands upon attribution theory in crisis communication to
suggest five types of crisis response strategies that speak to the three factors of attribution
theory listed above. Those five types, with accompanying examples, are as follows: 1)
nonexistence strategies (denial, intimidation); 2) distance strategies (denial of any intent,
or minimizing damage); 3) ingratiation (praising others, bolstering); 4) mortification
strategies (repentance); and 5) suffering strategy (seeking sympathy). Coombs defines
these five types as the most common strategies used by an organization to help the public
reshape or reframe the crisis, to help the public determine where responsibility lies.
Further, Coombs suggests the more an organization can reframe for the public so that the
crisis lies outside its locus of control, the more forgiving the public will be toward an
organization. Coombs' application of attribution theory to crisis communication requires
that these five types of strategies be considered within the context of the organization's
crisis history, the type of crisis at hand, the strength of any evidence about the
organization's role in the crisis, and how well the organization has performed, overall, in
the eyes of the public. Each of the five serve at least one of three purposes: to convince
stakeholders there really is no crisis (denial, for example); to see the crisis as less
negative than a first assessment would suggest (minimizing damage); or allow the
stakeholder to see the organization through a more positive lens, with the "help" of the
crisis (such as the use of ingratiation).
Early in the 21st century, Seeger (2002) introduced chaos theory as a framework
for organizational response to crisis. This theory is, without a doubt, one of the more
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intriguing theories in play in the communication field. It converges the social sciences
with the so-called "hard" sciences such as physics and mathematics, in that it requires a
view of organizations as the interplay of dynamic tensions within complex systems
within a system. Seeger proposes that chaos theory unifies a variety of academic
disciplines with one meta-theoretical framework for research. One can grasp the viability
of chaos theory as a communicative approach to crisis within Seeger's assessment that
this theory seeks to identify predictive understanding of events, but without relying solely
on causal patterns. Chaos theory suggests the inevitable bifurcation that accompanies
crisis can allow organizations to evolve into a higher level of order. This presumably
better level of organizational order births emergent self-organization. In Seeger's view of
organizational crisis, the participants in the organization engage in a natural process in
which order re-emerges out of the chaotic state.
Chaos theory further suggests this self-organization takes place through fractal
sets, or naturally-occurring self-repeating patterns. The concept of strange attractors
round out Seeger's definition of chaos theory, and speaks to the way in which typically
unrelated entities come together, as if by a magnetic force, to create alliances that form
the basis from which organizations can provide crisis communication. Seeger suggested
that chaos theory is "tailor made" for communicative response to natural disaster crises.
Acts-of-God crises such as floods or Hurricanes, he suggested, almost inevitably cause a
breakdown in communication in organizations due to loss of power, telephones, and
computers. In the absence of traditional order, persons in organizations will re-organize
themselves, followed by the next predictable step of formation of alliances (or, in
Seeger's terms, strange attractors). Faith-based groups with radically different
philosophies band together to provide aid; governmental organizations work
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cooperatively with other organizations that typically would be perceived as competitive
for scarce funding.
Euphemism as crisis response defines yet another recent crisis management
strategy that has emerged in the past decade. Stein (1998) offered euphemism as a
strategy that, while often implemented by organizations in crisis, is not, in his opinion,
one to be emulated. Euphemism as crisis response refers to the practice of organizations
to minimize damage and/or responsibility in crises by phrasing response in such a way as
to appear to be direct in communication when in fact evasiveness is at play. Stein
described this approach as sinister, in that as the public to which organizations speak we
find ourselves mesmerized by the play of words that seeks to re-write events. For
example, making enormous personnel cuts that displace thousands of workers is redefined as "RIF," an acronym for Reduction-In-Force that sounds less traumatic than
"massive loss of jobs." Another example is the use of the phrase "human collateral" in
reference to numbers of persons killed as a result of war or other combative conflicts.
Stein suggests the philosophy implicit in euphemistic response to crisis is that some
thing(s) must die for other(s) to live. The appeal is to a survival-of-the-fittest, with the
intended audience being safely included in the group of the "fittest."
Organizational Learning Theory
Organizational learning theory provides a context in which entities can assess to
what degree they gain organizational wisdom in the wake of a crisis. Seeger and Ulmer
(2003) provided a generalized definition of organizational learning stating that it occurs
when an organization accommodates experience and information. Crisis, they suggest,
can provide the opportunity for an organization to gain wisdom from the experience of
the crisis itself, if the organization is so inclined, as well as equipped and able to access
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such learning. Cohen and Sproull (1996) further defined the parameters of organizational
learning in the context of three factors: does organizational learning create knowledge
within the organization that is procedural or declarative; are the results of the learning
retained in the minds of the individuals who comprise the organization, or in the
interactions between those individuals; and, does the learning reinforce current practices,
or does it provoke change? They place no value on either option, but instead suggest
that true organizational learning occurs when each of these three criteria are met.
Levitt and March (1996) and March et al. (1991) defined organizational learning
in the context of different categories than do Cohen and Sproull. They perceive
organizational learning as routine-based, history-dependent, and target-oriented.
Organizational learning, within this definition, is confirmed only when historical
experiences are incorporated into the life of the organization by means of changes in
practice and procedure. The cognitive, in other words, needs to be manifested in
behavior. Additionally, the learning is based on the organization's history, its own
experience of a phenomenon that leads to the behavioral change. Finally, organizational
learning is target-driven. In this context, the way in which the organization uses acquired
knowledge ultimately defines knowledge; it is based upon a utilitarian value to the
organization.
A particularly attractive feature of organizational learning theory is the
opportunity it provides for organizations to reframe perceptions of failure. Sitkin (1996)
suggested failure, as traditionally defined by an organization, is a necessity for effective
organizational learning. He suggested that learning through failure allows for the idea
that what was once perceived as failure by an organization, albeit on a small scale,
actually provides the basis for learning in a positive mode. Small failures provide
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opportunities for trial runs, if you will, of how the organization might respond if crisis
arrives in the form of failure on a much larger scale. The absence of organizational
behavior defined as failures may, in fact, illustrate lack of organizational awareness, and
hence, less likelihood of the ability to effectively adapt to crisis.
March, Sproull, and Tamuz (1991) expanded upon what constitutes organizational
learning pointing out that organizations, in reality, have fairly infrequent opportunities
from which learning can be gleaned. True opportunities for organizational learning
present themselves so infrequently that the opportunity for direct experience of the
"lesson learned," so to speak, will appear less frequently than learning indirectly appears
(i.e., by watching a competitor deal with a crisis in such a way that learning occurs from
indirect experience). They eloquently captured the dichotomy of organizational learning
within the assumption that true opportunities for learning occur infrequently, describing
organizational learning as" how organizations convert meager experience into
interpretations of history by experiencing infrequent experiences richly" (p. 2).
It is March et al.'s (1991) concept of converting meager experiences into an
opportunity for rich opportunities of organizational learning that most succinctly justifies
how organizational learning is an "equal opportunity," equally accessible theory of
organizational learning in times of crisis. This theory can work particularly well for
those organizations that do not operate in an environment of constant high-risk moments.
In this way, organizational learning as a theory complements the concept that high
reliability organizations (HROs) provide a useful basis from which non-HRO
organizations can assess learning.
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High Reliability Organizations
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007) coined the phrase "High Reliability
Organization" to reference those organizations that operate on a day-to-day basis in an
environment where risk and hazard are ever-present and threatening, and yet where the
organization experiences accidents or incidents at a lower-than-expected level. The High
Reliability Organization (HRO) is characterized not only by the high risk environment in
which it operates, but in the manner in which the organization functions day-to-day. The
successful HRO thrives in a state of constant heightened awareness of failure. Examples
of organizations that are easily recognizable but perhaps not often considered in terms of
high reliability include aircraft carriers, air traffic controllers, nuclear power plants, and
military special operations. HROs share five characteristics that are consistently,
vigilantly practiced. Successful HROs engage in the following common practices, such
as:
•

track small failures;

•

resist oversimplification;

•

remain sensitive to operations;

® maintain capabilities for resilience;
® take advantage of shifting locations of expertise.
An examination of each of these five characteristics reveals the nuance behind the
phrasing Weick and Sutcliffe assigned to effective HROs. Tracking small failures refers
to the habit of carefully watching for, monitoring, and analyzing small failures. In this
manner, HROs differ from non-HRO organizations in that small failures are assumed to
be warning signals of potentially larger problems that can escalate into crisis. HROs
approach problems or glitches not in terms of "how small" or "how reparable" is this
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scenario, as much as they approach them in terms of "what larger problem looms beneath
the surface of this smaller glitch?" Reluctance to simplify speaks to the effective HRO's
insistence on keeping an alert eye on the larger picture of the organization. While it is
true that simplification allows an organization to focus on several key issues, use of this
strategy long term as the predominant management plan reduces the opportunity to keep
all aspects of the organization at front-and-center. HROs maintain that the tendency to
simplify, while useful on a short-term basis, misses the early warning signals and other
methods by which self-assessment and risk assessment can be retrieved. Remaining
sensitive to operations complements resistance to simplification in that sensitivity to
operations keeps the components of the well-managed operation constantly in sight.
Management in HROs appreciates the need not only for sensitivity to the systemic
operations of the organization, but also to the relationship of those operations to the
people who actually perform them. A beneficial by-product, then, of ongoing awareness
of the sensitivity to the human operation of the actual services is an increased likelihood
that employees will inform management of potential failures before they materialize.
The fourth common HRO characteristic, commitment to resilience, indicates an inner
organizational commitment to persevere and remain viable even if inevitable threats to
the well-being of the organization emerge. Weick and Sutcliff (2001) aptly summed up
the HRO's commitment to resilience by stating, "The hallmark of an HRO is not that it is
effort-free but that errors don't disable it" (p. 14). The fifth HRO characteristic,
deference to expertise, speaks to the respect for, and inclusion of, input from
organizational members at all levels of the operation. An effective HRO has less interest
in a rigid reporting structure than in an environment which invites, encourages, and
rewards input from members. These members, through daily routine and practice of their
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crafts, are perceived as experts as a result of their training or experiences. Venette (2003)
pointed out individuals closest to an identified problem will typically possess information
as useful to decision-making as any other source of input, sometimes more so. In fact,
when that inherent input based on experience is ignored, employees may tend to perceive
themselves as less knowledgeable, and expect management to provide knowledge at a
level that it may, in fact, not possess. Further, an organization that leaves employees out
of the equation when seeking high reliability mindfulness runs the risk of creating just the
opposite effect of benign mindlessness among employees (Novak, 2006). Employees
who do not expect the opportunity to give input will, over time, potentially slip into a
routine of inattention to risk-reducing detail.
If HROs operate in a constant state of high intensity, high-risk environments with
"exciting" settings such as combat zones and aircraft carriers, of what could more
"mundane" organizations such as law firms and lumber companies take note? They
should take note because, in all organizations, in one form or another, crisis will occur.
The value of HROs to lower-risk, lower-intensity organizational settings is that the habits
honed by HROs serve as real-life, real-time examples of crisis planning, implementation,
and practice. Any organization is one crisis away from destruction. One foreign object
found in a food product, one poorly executed maintenance routine, one ignored safety
check, one act of sexual misconduct, or one category five Hurricane can cause enormous
harm - including destruction - of an organization.
It is important to note, however, that proponents of the HRO concept do not assert
that an organization must obtain and nurture all five characteristics of an HRO as listed
above. While the very nature of environmentally intense HROs require the presence of
these shared attributes, less risk-prone organizations have the flexibility to observe, learn,
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and adapt those practices that make the most sense for them. Indeed, Vogus and
Welbourne (2003) suggested those organizations not typically needing to operate in total
"HRO mode" will gain the most use from adoption of the concept of "mindfulness" in the
effective HRO. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) defined mindfulness as "a rich awareness of
discriminatory detail" (p. 32). Vogus and Welbourne maintained that mindfulness aptly
combines the five characteristics into an easier-to-access concept for lower-risk
organizations to implement. Practice of mindfulness allows the organization to keep the
big picture in mind - including deference to expertise and understanding of operations while attending to the smaller detail that may reveal a risk-laden scenario.
Vogus and Welbourne (2003) linked Weick and Sutcliffe's (2007) concept of
mindfulness to Perrow's (1994) concept of tight coupling, speaking to the way that nonHROs may best gain useful practice from the study of HROs. The degree to which an
organization is perceived as an HRO depends in some part upon the measure of loose and
tight coupling in the organizational structure, a concept introduced by Perrow (1994).
Perrow described organizations that engage in tight coupling as those that have no buffer
between phases of operation, output, or process (p. 90). The organization's flow of
business service or product creation is so intricately interwoven that the slightest
variation of routine of one step immediately and potentially adversely affects the ensuing
steps. Tight coupling can be found in highly structured linear organizations such as
factories, as well as in highly structured complex organizations, such as a nuclear power
plant.
Conversely, Perrow (1994) describes loosely coupled organizations as those
enjoying a higher level of intra-organizational flexibility among functions, departments
or steps in a process (p. 91). A departure from normal operating procedure in one area of
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a loosely coupled organization will not necessarily cripple another area. The impact of
such a departure may result in an impact on the rest of the organization along a
continuum of no impact at all to direct impact. Loosely coupled organizations tend to be
characterized by highly organized, multi-level areas of operation. A university serves as
a good example of an organization that typically engages in loose coupling (p. 97). An
interruption of the teaching process in the biology department with the unexpected
absence of an instructor will significantly, directly, and immediately impact that
department, with no - or scant - impact on, for example, the history department.
However, the loss of electricity in the physical plant will likely create a significant,
direct, and immediately felt impact on most, if not all, areas of the university.
It would be inaccurate to infer that, overall, loose coupling in organizations
creates an inherent advantage over tight coupling. The nature of the organization, as well
as its product or service, impacts the efficacy of loose or tight coupling. For example,
Perrow (1994) pointed out that tight coupling allows for a more time-dependent response
to crisis than does loose coupling. However, the degree to which the organization has
prepared for, and engaged in, appropriate crisis management response impacts the degree
to which crisis creates failure in organizations that engage in tight coupling, not the tight
coupling itself. On the other hand, Seeger (2002) maintained that organizations engaging
in tight coupling do tend to experience accidents more often than loosely coupled
organizations (p. 13). They theorize that the inflexibility of tightly coupled organizations
inherently limits the options for effective crisis response. Conversely, then, they assert
that loosely coupled organizations enjoy a level of ambiguity and flexibility that allows
for creative response to crisis, which in turn increases the chances of averting failure.
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The HRO organization, provides a framework in which the theory of
organizational learning can be placed. In this fashion, an organization, post-crisis, can
assess to what degree the infrequent experience of a crisis provided opportunities for
learning. Further, the HRO model can provide the foundation from which to assess
learning. Organizational learning theory within a context of HROs provides the
framework and the checklist by which an organization can assess what has been gained
from the incident of crisis. The organization that experiences a natural disaster-related
crisis is, arguably, the most likely candidate for the effective blending of organizational
learning within the tenets of HROs. Natural disaster-related crises are fairly infrequent
for the average organization, if "infrequent" can be assumed to mean an occurrence of
less than once per year.
Organizational Crisis Communication with Employees
What does the literature say about effective communication with employees
during and after organizational crisis? Surprisingly little. A review of more than 20
scholarly articles pertaining to organizational communication and crisis revealed only
seven articles that addressed, either directly or indirectly, the role of internal
communication for an organization in crisis. What can be gleaned from the literature
regarding if, when, and how to communicate with employees during organizational crisis
is reviewed here.
Billings, Milburn and Schallman (1980) explored the element of surprise that is
part-and-parcel of crisis, and the high level of emotional response that crisis situations
tend to evoke in employees. They discussed the concept of emotional inoculation, a
coping mechanism that is triggered by an organizational event that meets the definition of
a crisis and for which there was no warning. A "shorthand" definition of emotional
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inoculations refers to the high level of stress and anxiety which an unanticipated event in
the life of an organization creates in an employee, in the absence of any information that
may have been present prior to the event. In other words, when the employee has access
to information about potential crises, whether of high or low probability, he is caught off
guard and experiences a sense of loss, threat, and anxiety in the face of an organizational
event. Billings et al. suggested in their research, published fairly early in the history of
crisis communication research, that planning and anticipation of possible crisis events on
the part of organizations can help lessen the probability of anxiety and stress on the part
of employees when crises inevitably occur.
Mitroff et al. (1987) acknowledged the importance of providing coping
mechanisms to employees as commentary on their systems approach to crisis
management. They describe the coping phase in terms of drawing a close, tight net
around the crisis event, and in the process, implementing pre-determined crisis
management teams. These teams, Mitroff suggested, should focus on emotional
responses of employees within organizations in crisis. He reminds organizations that
predictable human emotional response to crisis such as denial, depression, and anger are
often difficult to manage, especially in the absence of planning for crisis.
Pearson and Mitroff (1993) also urged organizational review of crisis
management response to determine to what degree, if any, employees' feedback has been
sought regarding needs and skills in relation to whatever equipment or technology is
involved in performing one's job functions. These kinds of considerations, they
maintained, become of paramount importance when crisis occurs. Lack of regard for the
opinion and advice of employees who are "hands on" with organizational materials, tools,
and equipment can create significant increase in employee stress during periods of crisis.
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If such considerations have not been taken into account, an employee's sense of personal
accountability in a crisis is usually heightened. Subsequently, then, organizations also,
Pearson advised, engage in "no fault learning," which is to say, avoidance of placing
blame for the crisis on an individual employee, except in scenarios of deliberate bad faith
action.
Weick's (1988) sense making model of crisis management is based in large part
on the role of employees in the enactive perspective. In fact, the human response to crisis
is the absolute basis of Weick's enactment perspective. New realities are put into motion
only in the enactment phase of response to crisis. He further suggests the concept of
"tenacious justification" on the part of the organization can be beneficial to employees, in
that it can help generate meaning and order in the face of confusion, fear, and ambiguity.
It can also provide a much-needed sense of order for the organization's personnel. Weick
also pointed out the importance of sense-making for employees in a crisis-ridden
organization in terms of developing a sense of capacity. If, after initial surprise has
subsided, the organization can assist the employee in seeing how he has the capacity to
assist in the face of the crisis, that sense of capacity can create difference. Stated another
way, Weick suggested that a sense of capacity begets a sense of making a difference,
which begets the much-needed sense of control which had been lost in the aftermath of
the crisis.
In November 2001, after the horror of the September 11 attacks, Kiger (2001)
presented research addressing the information gap regarding effective organizational
communication with employees during and immediately after times of crisis. Key issues
covered in his research included the need to communicate immediately with all
employees, whether local or based halfway around the world. Further, traditional
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avenues of instant communication such as e-mail, text messaging, and telephoning may
not be functional. Kiger recommends a crisis response plan that includes continually
updated contact names and telephone numbers of all employees, so that as soon as
communicative tools are re-established, personal contact can be immediately
implemented. Once that contact is initiated, Kiger maintained the communicative needs
of the employee are quite often very similar to the communicative needs of other
stakeholders. All constituent groups, employees in particular, want to know the status of
co-workers, the status of their employment and benefits, and how they can help.
Employees cannot hear too often that the organization will survive, that the chief
operating officer is highly visible and in control, and that a planned response is already in
operation. In short, employees need basic assurances that all will be well right now, next
week, and beyond.
Seeger and Ulmer (2002) provided one of the more fascinating analyses of
organizational crisis communication in which attention to employees in the organization
intentionally drives the response to the crisis. Seeger and Ulmer, in an effort to provide
an alternative to a defensive response to crisis, researched the responses in which two
organizations made care for, and attention to, employees the basis on which all crisis
response was predicated. Seeger and Ulmer cited Maiden Mills and Cole Hardwoods as
examples of organizations whose management chose to frame post-crisis discourse
solidly in terms of potentially positive outcomes of negative events. In doing so, the
owners of these two companies exhibited an astonishing degree of commitment to their
employee groups as the basis on which new and innovative directions their businesses
would take.
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Both Maiden Mills and Cole Hardwoods are independently-owned businesses that
were destroyed by fires; Maiden Mills in 1995 and Cole Hardwoods in 1998. Owners
Feuerstein and Cole, respective owners of these business enterprises, each determined his
business would re-build, would remain viable with competitors, and would do so by
demonstrating, both verbally and in deed, a commitment to the employees and to the
community in which the business was located. Both made immediate statements to the
local community and communicated to all employees that the business would re-build,
would remain in the local community, and that all employees would remain on payroll,
with no interruption in benefits. The actions were perceived in the larger business world
as an extraordinary business strategy gesture and action.
Seeger and Ulmer (2002) suggested that these actions demonstrated brilliant
response to crisis, not just in terms of the evident care and commitment the owners
demonstrated toward their employees. They suggest in the act of putting employee
welfare first, the owners accomplished two goals simultaneously. First, they clearly
demonstrated that employees are stakeholders in the business, thus widening the
understanding and scope of what it means to speak immediately to one's stakeholders,
post-crisis. Additionally, they took the emphasis off the typical negative reaction to a
crisis - in each case, a devastating fire - and placed the emphasis squarely in terms of a
positive, humanitarian, and innovative entrepreneurial event.
Further, Seeger and Ulmer (2002, 2003) proposed that these acts speak to the
moral imperative of organizations to respond in an ethical manner to their employees
during times of crisis. They described the imperative as post-crisis organizational virtue,
in which the values of the organization's sense of social responsibility are either revealed
or reinforced. The social responsibility of reaching out to one's workforce is measured
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by a variety of standards, including types of outreach offered, immediacy of
communication, quality of communication and reassurance - when it can be given - that
the organization still has a future that includes the workforce. Seeger and Ulmer (2003)
expanded upon the concept of virtuous organizational leadership by offering three kinds
of communication-based responsibilities in which organizational leaders should engage
in times of crisis. They include: a) communicating values that create a moral climate; b)
communicating in a way that invites thorough knowledge of organizational operations;
and c) maintaining openness to signs of problems. The third "must have" form of
communication is consistent with Weick and Sutcliffe's (2001, 2007) earlier delineated
theory of HROs. As well, it emphasizes a contemporary societal expectation of social
responsibility, a la creation of a moral climate, which may likely extend to social
responsibility in the face of natural disaster-related crisis.
Events within the past seven years in American history have emphasized the
imperative Seeger and Ulmer (2003) suggested that a moral imperative exists for
organizations to respond to their employee stakeholders with the same level of care and
investment as they do for their public stakeholders such as stockholders, customers, or
clients, and the general public or community where it is located. Recent national events
have painfully illustrated that in times of crisis, the federal government's level of
response has created a lowered level of expectation among Americans. A new reality has
emerged, and that reality can best be described as an acknowledgment of its citizenry that
the United States government cannot be counted on to fully anticipate, provide for, and
protect its citizens in crisis incidents of a national scale. The terrorist bombings of the
United States Pentagon and the New York World Trade Center towers in September of
2001 were followed in fairly short order by the destruction wreaked on the southeastern
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United States by Hurricane Katrina. Both of these national crises illustrated all too
painfully the inability of the federal government to intervene in effective ways. Benson
(2006) noted that some government officials themselves, in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, articulated the shortcomings of the federal government regarding adequate
response. These officials urged local communities to acknowledge and address the need,
therefore, for communities to prepare themselves accordingly.
Heath (1997) stated that during times of crisis, audiences are more attentive to
messages from the organization. Heath also proposed that this heightened attentiveness
provides an opportunity for the organization to demonstrate a commitment to effective
communication, and a commitment to taking responsible action. With an organization's
employees defining one type of audience to which that organization should attend, the
opportunity for enacting demonstrable commitment becomes crucial to surviving crisis.
The results of research by Sanchez et al as early as 1995 spoke to the need for
business organizations to engage in proactive response to employees in the wake of a
natural disaster. Like research previously cited, their analysis of the ways in which
corporations responded to Florida-based employees in the wake of Hurricane Andrew
confirmed that responding as a responsible employer parallels response as a responsible
member of the larger community. Employees in the aftermath of a natural disaster are
consumed with meeting basic needs: where will I live, what and how will I eat, how will
I survive?
Harvey and Haines (2005) concluded that companies that participate in the
recovery of the communities in which their employees live are likely to reap intangible
benefits. They determined that how the management of a company interacts in the
recovery process is just as important as what they do. An employee is likely to attach a
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positive emotional response to an employer's involvement in their and their
communities', recoveries. In short, the why, the how, and the what of the organizational
interaction with the recovering community are often positively significant to the
employee.
Maslow's Needs Hierarchy
Maslow described a hierarchy of needs that humans seek to meet in an effort to
reach full human potential (1954). Maslow described this potential as self-actualization.
Self-actualization is based upon stages of physiological, emotional, and psychological
needs that must be met, and in a certain order, for human self-fulfillment to be achieved.
A broadly generalized explanation of the hierarchy of needs suggests the basic
physiological needs must be met before the luxury, so to speak, of emotional and
psychological needs can be addressed. An understanding of both Maslow's definition
and description of basic physiological needs provides a context in which to assess
effectiveness of crisis communication.
Maslow (1954) stated all humans are motivated by needs specific to us as
humans: the need for food, safety, protection, and care. It is upon these basic survival
needs that other needs are formed and ultimately met. When these basic needs are not
met, the acquisition of them becomes of primary, overriding importance. All other needs
are pushed aside; psychological and emotional needs become irrelevant in the face of
unanswered basic survival needs. Further, Maslow asserted, a person's vision of what his
future entails changes dramatically in the threat of loss of basic survival needs. Social,
professional, and emotional aspirations become virtually irrelevant when humans are
deprived of safety, food, shelter, and care. Maslow suggested there is, even within the
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context of physiological needs, yet another level that he describes as the safety needs:
security, stability, protection, and ultimately, freedom from chaos and/or anxiety.
The degree to which employers can assist their workforce in addressing those
basic survival concerns will impact the degree to which the communities in which they
live regain normalcy as well. Stated very explicitly, organizations exist in communities
comprised of humans who, in times of crisis, experience an overwhelming need to have
basic survival needs met. Maslow (1954) suggested that any act that helps humans regain
equilibrium, after temporary loss of basic human survival needs, will be perceived as a
beneficial psychological gain. Thus, the organization that takes definitive steps to assist
employees in regaining psychological equilibrium through a reordering of food, safety,
and shelter exercises both good citizenship and good employee relations. What benefits
the employee benefits the community in which he lives. In times of crisis, this concept
moves beyond a "good will building" public relations concept into a literal life-or-death
reality.
Similarly, Schouten et al. (2004) saw the role of business organizations as integral
members of their communities. According to Schouten et al, when high levels of
commitment to the work force are communicated by the employer to the employee, the
organization becomes a stabilizing force both in the lives of employees and in the larger
community. The workplace typically serves a significant organizing force in the lives of
adults. Not only does one's employment provide wages, it provides other tangibles such
as medical insurance and retirement pensions. Equally important, the workplace provides
intangibles such as structure, stability, and opportunities for interpersonal relationships
and support. Therefore, Schouten and colleagues contended, the stability employers offer
to employees, particularly in the wake of a disaster, ultimately also serves as a stabilizing
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force for the larger community in which the organization is placed. This assessment
parallels research by Seeger and Ulmer (2002) regarding the societal and ethical role of
the organization in times of crisis. Hoffman's (2006) research found the level of social
support one finds in place in the aftermath of a natural disaster - specifically, a flood —
correlates with positive psychological outcomes measured in those persons who
experienced the disaster firsthand. The emotional support that often is intertwined with
the social support found in the work place can greatly aid the disaster victim in his return
to a sense of stability and normalcy.
Impact of Employee Characteristics
An analysis of organizational crisis communication provides an opportunity to
discern to what degree, if any, varying factors among a common group impact the way in
which communication is both received and perceived. Employees, for example, share the
commonality of the same employer. However, variances exist within that employment
status; employees differ in a variety of ways, including age, sex, race, number of years of
employment and for some organizations, work site location. Allen (1995) addressed the
variant of race in an organization to emphasize the need for organizations to be cognizant
of, and build upon, differences that can enrich an organization, if those differences are
viewed as enriching the organization instead of limiting it.
Rosenfeld, Richman and May (2004) analyzed the impact of information
adequacy to job satisfaction as it relates to work location. Their research determined that
both levels of job satisfaction and satisfaction with information adequacy are, in fact,
impacted by one's work location. Two types of employees, those in the office and those
"in the field," were surveyed regarding information adequacy, and differences were, in
fact, confirmed. This study confirmed the importance of organizational communication
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analysis within the context of employee differences imposed by the organization itself.
In this case, the imposed factor is location.
On the other hand, Cheney, Zorn, Planalp and Lair (2008) speak to the need for
organizational communication scholars to more fully explore and define the impact of
variances within a work force over which the organization has no impact. They urge
further research regarding to what degree meaningful work for employees is impacted by
multiple differences, such as ethnicity, nationality, gender and class. The rapidly
changing global nature of businesses, and thus work forces, requires organizations to
continually assess variances in work force demographics that may require adjustments in
communication strategies. Information adequacy perceptions by employees ultimately
will be impacted by variables both inside and outside the scope of the organization. The
organization may determine from what location, for example, an employee works telecommuting, local office, "in the field," etc. - but cannot fully control the variables
that further inform employee satisfaction with communication: age, sex, race, or even
religious beliefs. Effective communication strategies, therefore, require careful
consideration of all factors impacting how an employee will perceive information.
Each organization's unique qualities determine what characteristics may impact
organizational crisis communication. For example, organizational cultural issues may be
impacted by for-profit or non-profit status, the kind of educational qualifications required
for employment, or the degree to which the organization is diversified by geographical
locations, including cyberspace-based work sites. An effective organizational study will
require an understanding of the individual characteristics, and their nuances, that
comprise an organization.
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For this particular case study, analysis focused on three characteristics of the
employment pool at the time of the crisis that may have impacted perceptions. Those
three variables include number of years of employment with the organization, work site
location in relation to the disaster and pay type. Given the non-profit nature of the
organization analyzed, as well as the primacy of an educational mission for the
university, these characteristics provided a basis for meaningful comparison.
Within an organization, differences of employee perceptions may exist based on
length of employment. For an institution of higher learning, length of employment is
often a resulting function of two of the three variables highlighted in this study:
employment length and pay type. An inherent stratification among university employees
exists by the mere nature of the organization, based on the fact that tenured professors
tend to stay at one institution throughout the length of their careers - thus creating along
term employment relationship with one organization - and they are typically paid on a
salaried basis. On the other hand, the majority of non-teaching employees who support
the educational mission of a university may experience greater turnover of personnel,
absent the job insurance of tenure. Further, the majority of these non-teaching employees
are often paid on an hourly basis instead of salaried.
Additionally, institutions of higher learning are frequently multi-site
organizations. These multi-site organizations usually identify a "home" campus at which
the higher level administration is housed, and which becomes the landmark campus of
reference for the university. Satellite campus-based employees may possess varying
views of the organization based on physical distance from that main campus, which in
turn could hold implications for effective organizational communication practices.
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Summary
This study will examine the degree to which one organization, in the aftermath of
a natural disaster crisis, enacted organizational learning. It will also determine to what
degree attributes of High Reliability Organizations were used, and with what degree of
success, based on feedback from employees. The concept of organizational learning and
the degree to which it is manifested utilizing a High Reliability Organization perception
scale yielded the following research questions:
RQla: How do employees characterize their organization's communication in
response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on length of employment with the
organization? RQlb: How do employees characterize their organization's
communication in response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on employee work
location in relation to the disaster? RQlc: How do employees characterize their
organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on
pay type? This data will provide information about internal crisis communication with a
group of stakeholders seldom studied in the literature; namely, how employees perceive
employer's efforts to communicate with them. The data will allow the opportunity for
response of employees to the organization. In doing so, strategies for improving upon
internal crisis communication efforts can be assessed and, if appropriate, improved.
RQ2: To what degree do employees characterize their organization as an HRO in
the aftermath of a natural-disaster induced crisis? Information regarding whether or not
an organization is perceived by employees as having utilized HRO characteristics in
response to a natural disaster crisis will greatly broaden existing uses of the HRO scale.
Amending the HRO characteristics in a survey form in order to describe an organization
that typically does not operate in a high risk environment will test the feasibility of
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applying the HRO scale to less high-risk organizations. In doing so, an organization has
the potential to ascertain if organizational learning has occurred, from the employee
perspective of risk management.
RQ3a: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on length of employment with the organization? Such
data will provide insight into the degree to which a longer term employee/employer
relationship affects an employee's perception of the organization. Ascertaining if
perceptions vary based upon employee length of service informed to what degree, if any,
an organization may need to adjust operations. This information will be especially
helpful to organizations that value positive employee perceptions of high reliability.
RQ3b: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on employee work location in relation to the disaster?
To what degree the geographical location of the workplace impacts an employee's
perception of organizational reliability may prove particularly insightful when a multisite organization assesses communication efficacy in times of natural disaster crises.
What proves to be effective at one location may or may not show statistical significance
in comparison with other sites. Similarly, data may reveal there is no significant
difference based on geographical location, and therefore crisis communication strategies
do not need to be location-sensitive. Such information may potentially provide an
organization with the impetus to adjust risk management procedures - and dissemination
of such - based upon the needs of various work sites.
RQ3c: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on salaried or hourly employment status? The federal
government distinguishes, for purposes of fair labor standards, between employees who
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are paid an hourly wage and those employees who are salaried. Hourly wage employees
are eligible for overtime pay from an employer, unlike the salaried employee who is paid
a flat wage, no matter what amount of time is required to accomplish a task or project.
Subsequently, the quality of relationship between an employer and these two types of
employees may differ in intangible ways. An employer, then, may find that the type,
scope, and frequency of communication with an employee in times of natural disaster
crisis vary based on the way in which the employee is compensated. Such a finding may
potentially provide a rationale for further assessment and possible adjustment of
employee relations strategies, based on compensation status.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the procedures used to collect and analyze data for the
purpose of addressing the research questions listed below. It provides rationale for the
research procedures selected; information regarding the organization surveyed; how the
procedures were implemented with the sample population; and how the data was
analyzed.
Mixed Method Approach
This research employed a mixed method research design in case study form,
analyzing an educational organization; specifically, a dual campus, mid sized public
university located in the southeast. Detailed explanation of this approach follows.
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) defined mixed methodology as the use of both the
quantitative and qualitative research paradigms within the same study. The use of mixed
methodology research has caused much debate in recent decades regarding its appropriate
place in social sciences research. However, contemporary research scholars endorse the
concept that a blending of the two methodologies, in certain research arenas, is both
appropriate and even necessary to obtain the most vigorous assessment of the research
question.
Morse (2003) succinctly provided a cogent rationale for the implementation of
mixed method design in reminders that the ultimate goal of social science research is to
obtain the most complete picture possible of human behavior and experience. There are
times, then, when implementation of both quantitative and qualitative research design in a
study will help us reach more quickly the understanding we seek in our research
endeavors. Mixed method research design can prove to be especially powerful when
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analyzing extraordinary events, such as a natural disaster, when the combination of selfreported survey responses about the event is incomplete without grasping the details and
stories about self-reported responses to the experience. In short, the "what" question of
the experience of the event necessitates asking the "why" and the "how" in a way that
quantitative research design cannot readily capture. Conversely, the "why" and the
"how" cannot be ascertained until the "what" is defined by the quantitative research
design. A key component of the success of mixed method research design, according to
Morse (2003), is the need for a clearly defined dominant method in the research design,
with additional methodologies supplementing the goals of the dominant method.
Contemporary communication scholars have utilized a mixed method research
design approach with success. Venette (2003), for example, used a mixed methodology
with a quantitative survey followed by oral interviews to determine risk communication
perceptions of employees in a high reliability organization. Venette, Lang, and Coyle
(2003) employed a combination of an electronic survey with focus group discussions to
study risk communication as argument, analyzing student perceptions of responsible
drinking.
The current study utilized a quantitative research design as the primary form of
data collection, using qualitative methodology to enhance understanding of the data that
were collected quantitatively. For this study's research purposes, qualitative data was
gathered via both individual and focus group interviews. Based upon feedback gleaned
from those two sources, a written survey was administered to provide quantitative data.
This study addressed the following research questions:
RQla, RQlb, andRQlc: RQ1 a: How do employees characterize their
organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced crisis based on
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length of employment with the organization?; RQlb: How do employees characterize
their organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced crisis
based on employee work location in relation to the disaster?; and RQlc: How do
employees characterize their organization's communication in response to a naturaldisaster induced crisis based on pay type? This question assessed in what ways
employees responded to an organization's communication in response to Katrina, in
general terms that allow clarity about overall level of satisfaction, regardless of how those
responses correlate to characteristics of a high reliability organization. The primary
source of data for these three RQ's was qualitative data gathered in focus group meetings
and in open-ended questions in the written survey. The data was then reflected in the
wording of the written survey, providing a quantitative measure for the RQ's. These
RQ's were addressed in writing both by closed and by open ended questions on the
survey. One-way ANOVA analysis was conducted, as was frequency distribution using
chi-squared analysis.
RQ2: To what degree do employees characterize their organization as an HRO in
the aftermath of a natural-disaster induced crisis? This question employed the
characteristics of a high reliability organization in survey form (in both hard copy and
online options) to determine to what degree, if any, employees perceived the organization
as an HRO, and further, to provide data regarding why the organization was or was not
perceived as such around the event of Hurricane Katrina. The primary source of data for
this RQ was a quantitative, in the form of a written survey.
RQ3a: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on length of employment with the organization? This
RQ assessed the degree to which employment longevity correlates with perception of
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organizational reliability based on communication during natural disasters. RQ3a was
also explored with a quantitative method through a written survey.
RQ3b: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, following a
natural disaster-induced crisis, vary based on employee work location in relation to the
disaster? Data related to this RQ was gathered through the quantitative tool of written
survey and with qualitative data gathered via focus group interviews.
RQ3c: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability vary based on
salaried or hourly employment status? RQ3 was addressed in a quantitative survey
method, with a comparison and regression analysis between self-reported pay status and
responses to those survey questions that relate to HRO characteristics.
Case Study Approach
Yin (2003) aptly stated the rationale for the decision to use a case study approach
for analyzing the research questions presented in this study: "In general, case studies are
the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary
phenomenon within some real-life context" (p. 1). Certainly, the event that was
Hurricane Katrina fell outside the control of the employees of the organization that was
studied. Equally, the investigator's ability to control what, how, and why communication
with their employer affected these employees was also outside the realm of their control.
The focus of the study — assessing crisis communication efficacy within the organization
- remained contemporary. Though the initial event of Hurricane Katrina occurred more
than three years ago, the assessment of the crisis communication actions taken remains
relevant, so that "lessons learned" can be fully ascertained for use in the event of another
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Hurricane or other form of natural disaster. And, it cannot be denied, surviving a
category five hurricane is about as "real life" a context as one can find.
The case study, as Sypher (1997) saw it, allows the communication scholar to
appropriately blend theory with practice. Sypher spoke of the flexibility the case study
approach offers, particularly in its epistemic role. Sypher maintained case studies
provide multiple ways by which scholars can acquire useful data, applying four basic
categories based on case study focus: epistemic, rhetorical, skill enhancement, and
narrative. The epistemic approach suggests case studies provide a new way of knowing.
The rhetorical approach of a case study assumes an argument is inherent in the study; that
some form of evidence will emerge that informs a particular point of view. The skillenhancement approach speaks to the assumption we learn from observing. Therefore, the
investigator as communicator learns simply by observing, independently of whatever else
may emerge from the data. Finally, the narrative approach to case studies suggests the
value of the story rests, first and foremost, in the power of the story that emerges.
This case study approach is successfully utilized across all social science
disciplines. Recent examples include Miles' (2007) use of the case study method to
analyze one immigrant's experience in the United States as he negotiated a new cultural
environment, particularly in his place of employment. Grantham (2007) also adopted a
case study method to assess communication strategies employed in a recent corporate
takeover of one multinational company by another one.
This current study consisted of three key components. One involved individual
interviews with persons in the organization who implemented employee communication
before and after Katrina. These interviews helped ascertain what written and/or ad hoc
communication plan was implemented; individual perceptions of the efficacy of those
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plans; and reflections about the personal impact of attempting to initiate employee
communication from a professional sense of responsibility. The three focus groups
allowed for a "test drive" of the written survey's first draft. The feedback received from
this group proved invaluable in terms of understandability, readability and scope.
Equally important, the focus groups allowed for the chance to learn what key topics
relative to communication had not been included in the initial survey draft. Having input
from employees at various work sites tremendously increased the richness of the survey,
since it provided perspectives from multiple viewpoints, other than basic geographical
differences. The final component of the case study involved the distribution of a written
survey which combined both quantitative and qualitative questions.
Qualitative Research Design: Interviews
Qualitative data was obtained in two ways: individual interviews with persons
within the organization who played a vital role in the organization's crisis communication
during and after Katrina, and focus group interviews with employees who were on
payroll during Katrina. Five employees were interviewed in one-on-one meetings during
which the investigator took written notes, recording the impressions and recollections of
the interviewee's role in communicating with employees during the time period
surrounding the Hurricane. Those interviewed included the university's human resources
director; two public relations administrators at the gulf coast campus; a public relations
administrator for the Hattiesburg campus; and the director of the Hattiesburg campus
physical plant. Through a series of questions that focused on the communicative process
right before and right after Katrina, the following themes emerged regarding
organizational communication decision-making and subsequent action:
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•

lack of a viable frame of reference regarding how to prepare, given the
enormity of the category 5 hurricane;

® lack of a viable frame of reference regarding how to respond, given the
enormity of the category 5 hurricane;
•

sense of helplessness to accurately warn and inform employees, once the
severity of the storm became evident;

o

sense of helplessness to respond and communicate, in the days immediately
after Katrina hit, due to unprecedented loss of normal communicative
channels;

•

sense of guilt for being unable to "do more."

Information gathered from theses interviews, combined with the basic question which
comprised the HRO perception scale, formed the basis of the written survey that was
distributed to employee focus groups.
The focus groups were identified from the list of employees who were on payroll
during Katrina, with a goal of providing the greatest balance of support staff,
administrators and faculty.
Additionally, campus location was a factor in the creation of the list of employees
invited to participate, as was gender and ethnicity. To that end, three focus groups were
formed: one from the Hattiesburg campus, one from the Gulf Park/Long Beach campus,
and one at the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory. A total of 33 employees participated.
Each participant was assured anonymity, both in the written invitation to participate, as
well as verbally before the focus group discussion began. Sessions lasted approximately
one hour, with two of the sessions being held over the lunch hour and one being held mid
afternoon. Participants had received a draft of the survey approximately one week prior
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to the focus group meeting. They were asked to bring the survey to the meeting, and to
be prepared to offer verbal and/or written suggestions. A scribe was present at two of the
three sessions.
Common suggestions, themes and concerns that emerged from the focus groups
included the following:
® confusion about whether the respondent should think of the organization in
terms of the entire institution or in terms of geographic work location;
® expansion of the list of ways in which information was received, both before
and after Katrina;
9

a desire to have ample opportunity, via open ended questions on the survey, to
provide feedback about individual perceptions of the university's
communication with employees during the crisis;

•

clarification of time frames when responding to "before" and "after" questions
- i.e., how many days, weeks, etc constituted those concepts.

Additionally, participants in each focus group took the opportunity to discuss
personal experiences and impressions regarding the university in the aftermath of
Katrina, whether or not related to the topics addressed on the survey. The need to keep
the focus group on task was a challenging one. However, the discussion did illustrate the
potential for the HRO perception portion of the survey to capture opinions about noncommunication related topics that emerged in the focus groups. Issues of the role of
individual employee input in decision-making and perceptions of the university's interest
in being prepared for crisis, for example, were part-and-parcel of the HRO component of
the survey.

53

Quantitative Research Design: Survey
The primary quantitative research design form consisted of a written survey,
which was distributed to participants in both electronic and paper form. Venette's (2003)
"High Reliability Organization Perception Scale" served as the basis for the
questionnaire. Barrett, Novak, Venette, and Shumate (2006) tested the scale for
reliability, factor structure, and validity and found it to be supported in each of these
categories. Surveys have been effectively used in previous crisis communication
research. Blendon, Benson, Desroches, and Weldon (2003) used opinion surveys to
determine who the public trusts, and in what form they prefer to receive information in
times of national crisis. Procopio and Procopio (2007) focused on internet
communication in their study of effective use of messages during times of crisis. Barrett
et al. (2006) used a survey in their validity and reliability testing of Venette's HRO
perception scale.
The HRO scale was modified to clearly identify for survey participants that
perceptions about the university were being gauged. The modification, therefore, was a
slight one that involved clarifying that the "organization" referenced by the HRO scale
was the employer, the University of Southern Mississippi. The choice to use the phrase
"The University of Southern Mississippi (USM)" instead of delineating by work site was
a deliberate one. The rationale for choosing the institution as a whole as the target for
garnering employee perceptions, rather than specific sites, reflected the research goal of
remaining consistent with organizational terminology use. Since perceptions and
opinions may have varied among employees based on work site, the survey provided
open-ended questions that allowed for the chance to share opinions about individual work
sites.
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Research Design
The design of the research instrument illustrates the advantage of focusing on one
organization in a highly detailed manner. This study utilized the high reliability
organizational perception scale as validated by Barrett, Novak, Venette, and Shumate
(2006). Barrett et al.'s perception scale is itself based on Venette's (2003) employee
HRO perception scale. Though this scale relies exclusively on the collection of
quantitative data, the format allows for a logical adaptation to the needs of an
organizational survey that will gauge both quantifiable impressions and equallyimportant qualitative impressions. The impact of natural disasters on the employees of an
organization necessitates an understanding of the emotional, psychological, and even
physical impact of that disaster. The very nature of a natural disaster means the
organization cannot control or manipulate the locus of the crisis. Therefore, the impact
on employees - and hence, on the organization - requires inquiry into subjective
feedback which can then be transformed into useful data. Adapting this level of detailed,
intricate examination allowed the purpose of the research to remain narrowly focused and
therefore more likely to yield adaptable information for employers. The results of such
an intricate analysis can then be used as the basis for future research, such as the analysis
of differences, if any, between different types of for-profit and non-profit employee
perceptions of organizational communication during natural disasters.
Qualitative research design has been successfully used in previous research
conducted to assess communication around the issue of crisis. Hale, Dulek, and Hale
(2005) used interview research design for the response stages of crisis situations as
determined and implemented by crisis decision makers. Mebane, Termin, and Parvanta
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(2003) also used interviews as a means of analyzing how and why reporters
misinterpreted data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding
anthrax threats. Meredith, Eisenman, Rhodes, Ryan and Long (2007) used interviews to
collect data regarding perceptions that some African-Americans distrust public health
warnings concerning preparedness for bioterrorist attacks.
Description of the Organization and the Participants
The University of Southern Mississippi, founded in 1910, employs 2400 benefitseligible faculty and staff, and serves approximately 16, 000 students at two main
campuses: Hattiesburg in Forrest county, and Long Beach in west Harrison county.
Employees are also located at additional coastal sites that include a research laboratory in
Ocean Springs, and teaching sites at Keesler Air Force Base and in Jackson County. The
University of Southern Mississippi markets itself as a national university for the Gulf
South. Funding for The University of Southern Mississippi is derived from state support,
student fees, private donations and federal grants. Thus, the Gulf Coast communities in
which the university is located have a strong investment in the University of Southern
Mississippi economically, culturally, and socially. The role of the university within the
communities in which it is located speaks to the intricate mutual dependence that
Katrina's impact only served to heighten.
Participants
The participants in the survey and interviews were identified, with assistance from
the Department of Human Resources, from those current employees who were on payroll
in August 2005 at any of the campus locations listed above. The 1673 employees who fit
this criterion were invited to participate in the survey process via email. The email
provided a link to the survey, which was administered by a research group at North
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Dakota State University. Additionally, employees in jobs that typically do not require
computer access were invited to participate in the survey process at employee meetings.
Hard copies of the survey were distributed at staff meetings; 52 employees participated in
this fashion.
A total of 843 employees completed at least part of the survey, creating a fifty per
cent participation rate. Seven hundred participants responded to all questions. Eightyfive per cent of respondents were Hattiesburg-based employees; 8 per cent were Long
Beach/Jackson County/Keesler Air Force base employees; 7 per cent were Gulf Coast
Research Laboratory employees, and the remaining 36 surveys came from employees at
Stennis Space Center, comprising less than 1% of the surveys returned. Table 1 shows
the percentages of participated employees from each site who met the survey population
criteria.

Table 1
Percentages of Participated USM Employees from Each Site
Location

Percentage

Number

Hattiesburg

68.8%

580

Gulf Coast*

11.86%

100

GCRL

7.71%

65

Stennis

3.08%

26

No response

8.54%

72

*includes Long Beach/JacksonCounty/Keesler Air Force Base
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The Survey
The survey consisted of basic demographic information allowing participants to
identify the following characteristics, in addition to the work locations as listed above:
•

number of years of employment with the University of Southern Mississippi
(USM) at time of Katrina;

o

whether wages are earned on an hourly or salaried basis;

•

age;

® race;
© sex.
The ten questions forming the HRO perception scale were modified as follows to
meet the specifics of the organization and crisis being addressed:
1.

My opinions are taken into account in the daily operations at The University
of Southern Mississippi (USM).

2.

My opinions are taken into account in long-term planning within USM.

3.

My actions directly contribute to safeguarding USM's continued existence
as a successful university.

4.

My actions influence others to prevent significant mistakes at USM.

5.

USM is very concerned about the possibility of making high risk mistakes
that would jeopardize the organization.

6.

USM is committed to correcting shortcomings that could jeopardize the
organization.

7.

USM emphasizes maintaining effective operations.

8.

USM is committed to correcting shortcomings in their emergency response
procedures.
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9.

USM's supervisors and managers accept an employee's suggestions about
important issues when the employee has particular expertise in that area.

10.

USM often over-simplifies when communicating about complex emergency
response procedures.

All 10 items were used to form an index using a simple sum. As suggested by Venette
(2003), reliability was calculated using Cronbach's a (a [633] = .85). Thus, reliability
was determined to be suitable for the entire scale.
The remainder of the questions came from two sources. The first is the ad hoc
crisis response plan the university implemented around the crisis of Katrina, to determine
to what degree this plan met the communicative needs created by this particular event.
The response plan was extracted from details of interviews with key administrators in the
university who implemented the communication that was attempted. There was no
written response plan. Employee focus group feedback provided the second source of
questions, particularly the open-ended queries that allowed for individual stories to be
conveyed.
Tables 2 through 8 show respondents' self-reported number of years of
employment with the university, employee group, pay status, sex, race, age, and prior
experience with a hurricane.
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Table 2
Respondents' Self-reported Number of Years of Employment with the University
Number of years

Percentage

Number

Less than 10 years

39.97%

445

1 0 - 19 years

30.73%

259

20-29 years

12.45%

105

30-39 years

4.39%

37

.59%

5

40+ years
No response

11.86%

100

Table 3
Respondents' Self-reported Employee Group
Group

Percentage

Number

Staff

57.41%

484

8.66%

73

Faculty

25.74%

217

No response

8.19%

69

Administrator
(faculty and non faculty)
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Table 4
Respondents' Self-reported Pay Status
Pay type

Percentage

Number

Salaried

65.60%

553

Hourly

25.86%

218

8.54%

72

No response

Table 5
Respondents' Self-reported Sex
Sex

Percentage

Number

Female

58.36%

492

Male

32.50%

274

No response

9.13%

77

Table 6
Respondents' Self-reported Race
Race

Percentage

Number

White

86.36%

665

10.39%

80

Hispanic/Latino

1.43%

11

Native American

0.78%

6

Asian

1.04%

8

African American

61
Table 7
Respondents' Self-reported Age
Age group

Percentage

Number

18-25

0.36%

3

26-35

12.22%

103

36-45

20.05%

169

46-55

33.21%

280

56-65

21.35%

180

66-75

3.56%

30

75+

0.00%

0

No response

9.25%

78

Table 8
Respondents' Self-reported Prior Experience with a Hurricane
Experience

Percentage

Number

Yes

69.04%

582

No

21.59%

182

No response

9.37%

79
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Survey Data Description
The combination of quantitative and qualitative questions allowed for the
collection of data to address the RQ's listed previously. The pairing of RQ and survey
data is as follows:
RQla, RQlb and RQlc data were collected from responses to survey parts I and
II. Each section addressed perceptions of communication efforts before Katrinaspecifically, one week prior - and after Katrina - specifically, up to one month after the
Hurricane hit. A checklist of possible methods of communication was listed; respondents
were asked to indicate all ways in which they received communication from the
university. Respondents were then asked to rate their perceptions of the efficacy of those
communication efforts by way of a Likert scale rating which addressed adequacy of
conformation from the university regarding Katrina. This same format of a checklist,
followed by a rating of adequacy, formed the basis of parts I and II which became the
basis for determining response to RQ1, a-c. Additionally, the last question of the survey
allowed for an open-ended 'last call for feedback" opportunity for respondents to address
any issue about Katrina and their employer. The total of qualitative data provided for a
more complete picture of what did and did not work well in terms of communicative
efforts, as well as other outreach efforts. The three open-ended survey questions
prompted a response rate which reflects that 26.3% of all respondents provided feedback
for question #14; 38.8% of all respondents provided feedback for question #15, and
25.6% of all respondents provided feedback for question #17.
Finally, open-ended questions 14 and 15 allowed respondents to identify actions
(communicative or otherwise) that the university undertook both prior to and right after
Katrina hit. Two hundred-twenty two participants provided written responses to item 14,
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which requested the following feedback: "Please describe anything USM did for you, as
an employee, that you found particularly helpful right before Katrina hit." Three hundredtwenty seven participants provided written responses to item 15. Two hundred-sixteen
participants responded to item 17, which allowed participants to respond to this question:
"Is there anything you would like to say about Katrina and USM's response to the
hurricane, that has not been included in this survey? If so, please do so here." Two
coders tallied comments into the following categories for item 14:
•

time to deal with personal concerns (home, family)

•

facilitated safety: closed campus early, etc.

•

kept employees informed on the storms' status/severity

•

did nothing for me prior to Katrina

•

n/a; nothing to add/say here.

Comments were tallied into the following categories for item 15:
•

provided food/meals

•

distributed ice/water

•

assured me of job security

•

allowed time for personal concerns

•

got my paycheck on time

•

provided temporary housing

•

provided assistance (other than housing)

•

other.

Comments were tallied into the following categories for item 17:
•

USM communicated poorly with me
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® USM communicated adequately with me
® gratitude for what USM did do
•

lack of adequate follow-up from Hattiesburg-based admin(i.e., slow to
respond, inadequate response, etc.)

•

no/nothing/no response

® other.

Training with the two coders involved a review of the open-ended questions, the list of
generalized categories, and need to remain alert for each unit of measure to contain more
than one category of response. The coders were given a random sample of 30% of
responses from each question to individually code. Intercoder reliability was then
calculated using Scott's pi (Scott, 1955). Pi is the appropriate measure of reliability in
this instance as the data is nominal (i.e, placed into categories that have not been ranked
ordered) (Venette, 2006). The calculated reliability coefficients for all three of the openended questions were acceptable. For questions 14, pi equaled .78; for 15, pi was .74;
and for questions 17, pi totaled .64.
RQ2 data were collected from responses to the organization-specific HRO
questions found in Part IV. Part IV provided the data which most specifically addresses
employees' perceptions of HRO characteristics regarding the university, post-Katrina.
The HRO questions led to the creation of an HRO score, the results of which formed the
basis for analysis of HRO perception.
RQ3a data were collected from responses to the HRO scale in part IV. They were
correlated with responses found in demographic data regarding numbers of years of
employment with the university. One-way ANOVA analysis was conducted, as was
frequency distribution using chi-squared analysis.
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RQ3b data were collected from responses to the HRO scale in part IV. They were
correlated with responses found in the demographic data regarding employee work site
location. One-way ANOVA analysis was conducted, as was frequency distribution using
chi-squared analysis.
RQ3c data was collected from response to the HRO scale in part IV. They were
correlated with responses found in the demographic data regarding employee type, based
on whether wages were paid on an hourly or salaried basis. One-way ANOVA analysis
w as conducted, as was frequency distribution with chi-squared analysis.
Also in relation to RQ3a, RQ3b, and RQ3c, ordinal regression analysis was
performed to determine the relative contribution of the following variables to
respondents' perception of USM as an HRO:
e

number of years of employment

« Work site location
•

Employee type

Items 10 and 12 were included in the analysis to ascertain the relative contribution of
perceptions of information adequacy to perception of high reliability.
Finally, item 17 allowed respondents the opportunity to provide feedback
regarding any aspect of the organization's interaction with them around the event of the
hurricane that was not addressed elsewhere in the survey.
The described methodology has allowed for the collection and interpretation of
data, findings from which are presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This chapter presents the findings from the data gathered. To review, the data
were obtained from a written survey which was in turn based upon input gathered from
individual interviews and employee focus groups. The findings are detailed here, with
specific findings for the research questions addressed below.
The first eight questions of the survey sought basic demographic information:
work location when Katrina hit; number of years of employment at the university; staff or
faculty designation; hourly or salaried pay status; gender; race; age and prior hurricane
experience. This information was summarized in the previous chapter.
Pre-Katrina Information Adequacy Perceptions
The first three research questions were as follows: RQla: How do employees
characterize their organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced
crisis based on length of employment with the organization; RQlb: How do employees
characterize their organization's communication in response to a natural-disaster induced
crisis based on employee work location in relation to the disaster; and RQlc: How do
employees characterize their organization's communication in response to a naturaldisaster induced crisis based on pay type. Questions 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 17 were
designed to ascertain ways in which the university communicated with employees and to
what degree, based on those methods used, the communication was perceived as
adequate. A list of possible information sources remained the same for "prior to" and
"after" Katrina, for purposes of comparison. Email access is the exception to the list, as
it is not listed as an option for information source up to one month after Katrina. Table 9
illustrates the frequency of responses to question nine options. Information received from
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co-workers, email announcement, and TV announcements received the highest
percentage of communication type received prior to Katrina. Question 10 asked
respondents to indicate to what degree they found communication from the university,
prior to Katrina's arrival to be adequate.

Table 9
Ways Received Information One Week Prior to Katrina
Yes (%)

No (%)

Email

374 (44.4%)

469 (55.6%)

USM Website

247 (29.3%)

596 (70.7%)

Dept. Meeting

173 (20.5%)

670 (79.5%)

90 (10.7%)

753 (89.3%)

TV

268(31.8%)

575(68.2%)

Radio

158(18.7%)

685(81.3%)

Newspaper

126(14.9%)

717(85.1%)

Landline Phone

84(10.0%)

759(90.0%)

Cell Phone

120 (14.2%)

723 (85.8%)

Info. Co-Worker

385 (45.7%)

458 (54.3%)

56 (6.69%)

787 (93.4%)

Dept. Memo
USM Announcements

Other
Note: N = 843
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Table 10
Perception of Pre-Katrina Information Adequacy Scale
Frequency

Percent

Strongly Disagree

85

12.7

Disagree
Somewhat
Disagree

97

14.5

80

12.0

Neutral

119

17.8

68

10.2

Agree
Strongly Agree

150
69

22.5
10.3

Total

668

100.0

Somewhat Agree

Table 10 illustrates the degree to which respondents found information from the
university about the hurricane in the days prior to Katrina's arrival as adequate.
A one-way ANOVA was calculated to compare perception of information
adequacy one week prior to Katrina (M =3.07, SD = 1.94) to number of years of
employment, work location in relation to the hurricane and pay type. No significant
differences were found based on number of years of employment (F [6] = 1.61,/? = .14),
M =2.65, SD = .93; work location in relation to the hurricane (F [6] = 1.06,p = .38),
M =1.44, SD = .84; or based on pay type (F [6] = 1.83, p = .09), M = 1.72, SD = .45.
Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of
information adequacy one week prior to Katrina crosstabulated with the number of years
of employment. Results did not indicate that the distributions were significantly different
(x2 = 29.02, p= 52). Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to
perception of information adequacy one week prior to Katrina crosstabulated with work
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location in relation to the hurricane. Results did not indicate that the distribution was
significantly different (x2 [18] = 23.52,/? = .17). Chi square was also performed to
analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy one week
prior to Katrina crosstabulated with pay type. The data failed to support significant
differences in the distributions (x2 [6] = 10.94, p = .09).
Tables Al through A4, located in Appendix D, provide the data from which the
analysis was drawn.
Post-Katrina Information Adequacy Perceptions
Questions 11 and 12 sought perceptions of information adequacy after Katrina hit.
The survey requested more detailed information about types of information than did the
pre-Katrina questions. This more detailed response opportunity allowed respondents to
provide in depth three particular types of information compared - adequacy of job
security information, paycheck retrieval and return-to-work date - to be analyzed in
comparison with three separate characteristics: whether an employee receives a paycheck
biweekly or monthly (i.e. salaried employee); work location of the respondent; and
number of years of employment with the university. Tables A5-A13 in Appendix D
illustrate the findings.
Information Adequacy, Post-Katrina, Regarding Job Security
A one-way ANOVA (M = 5.17, SD = 1.95) was calculated to compare
perceptions of information adequacy up to one month after Katrina regarding job security
based on years of employment, work location in relation to the hurricane, and pay type,
No significant differences were found based on number of years of employment (F [7] =
0.48, p - .85); work location in relation to the hurricane (F [7] = 1.14, p = .34); and pay
type (F [7] = 1.75,/? =.09).
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Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of
information adequacy regarding job security up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated
with the number of years of employment. Results did not indicate that the distributions
were significantly different (x2 [35] = 25.18, p = .89). Chi square was also performed to
analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy regarding job
security up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with work location in relation to the
hurricane. Results did not indicate that the distributions were significantly different (x
[21] = 36.83,/? = .02), nor were distributions significantly different based on pay type (x
[7] = 12.18,/? = .10).
Information Adequacy, Post-Katrina, Regarding Paycheck Retrieval
A one-way ANOVA (M = 5.17, SD = 1.95) was calculated to compare
perceptions of information adequacy up to one month after Katrina regarding paycheck
retrieval based on years of employment, work location in relation to the hurricane, and
pay type. No significant differences were found based on number of years of
employment (F [7] =1.83, p = .08); work location in relation to the hurricane (F [7] = .85,
p = .55); and pay type (F [7] = .99, p = .44).
Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of
information adequacy regarding paycheck retrieval up to one month after Katrina
crosstabulated with the number of years of employment. Results did not indicate that the
distributions were significantly different (x2 [35] = 30.58,/? = .68). Chi square was
performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy
regarding paycheck retrieval up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with work
location in relation to the hurricane. Results did not indicate that the distribution was
significantly different (x2 [21] = 27.15,/? = .17). Chi square was also performed to

71
analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy regarding
paycheck retrieval up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with pay type. The data
failed to support significant differences in the distributions (x2 [7] = 6.92, p = .44).
Information Adequacy, Post-Katrina, Regarding Paycheck Retrieval
A one-way ANOVA (M = 5.21, SD = 1.91) was calculated to compare perceptions of
information adequacy up to one month after Katrina regarding return-to-work date, based
on years of employment, work location in relation to the hurricane, and pay type. No
significant differences were found based on number of years of employment (F [7] =1.84,
p = .08); work location in relation to the hurricane (F [7] = 1.01, p = .43); and pay type (F
[7] = .39,/? = .44).
Chi square was performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of
information adequacy regarding return-to-work date up to one month after Katrina
crosstabulated with the number of years of employment. Results did not indicate that the
distributions were significantly different (x2 [35] = 31.72, p = .63). Chi square was
performed to analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy
regarding return-to-work date up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with work
location in relation to the hurricane. Results did not indicate that the distribution was
significantly different (x2 [21] = 29.55,/? = .10). Chi square was also performed to
analyze the distribution of responses to perception of information adequacy regarding
return-to-work date up to one month after Katrina crosstabulated with pay type. The data
failed to support significant differences in the distributions (x2 [7] = 2.72, p = .91).
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Information Adequacy: Qualitative Results
Questions 14, 15 and 17 were designed to allow qualitative data collection from
respondents. Question 14 asked respondents to "Please describe anything USM did for
you, as an employee, that you found particularly helpful right before Katrina hit." A total
of 222 respondents (26% of survey respondents) provided comments. Comments fell into
one of three categories: positive impressions or experiences to share; negative
impressions or experiences to share; and simply a response of "nothing to add." The
majority of comments (62%) indicated positive perceptions of communication or action
on the part of the university prior to Katrina's arrival. Comments of a positive nature
centered primarily on appreciation for the university's concern for employee safety;
keeping employees informed about Katrina's status; and demonstrations by the university
of regard and concern for employees - i.e., time to prepare one's home and family for the
impending storm.
Qualitative Results: Positive Feedback, Pre-Katrina
The following statements are representative of the opinions expressed that were of
a positive nature:
Honestly, did anyone think Katrina would be so devastating? I think it was the
appropriate information for what everyone was expecting.

Suggested what to do with office contents in preparation for the storm, and
informed us where to look for information concerning our return to work.

Closed the University in time, so I could get ready at home.
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Made us more aware and letting us prepare our own belongings and personal
property.
Thus, subthemes which emerged from the comments of a positive nature were
appreciation for: evident concern for employee safety; keeping employees informed of
the storm's path and adequate time to attend to personal safety.
Qualitative Results: Negative Feedback, Pre-Katrina
However, 84 (38%) comments reflected negative assessments of actions taken by
USM prior to Katrina. The following statements are representative of the opinions
expressed that were of a negative nature:
Nothing; in fact, there was no communication that the university was closing until
the day the storm hit. My family and I evacuated prior to the storm; I canceled my
classes accordingly and well before the university communicated anything to the
staff, faculty, and (most importantly) the students.
Nothing. I left work Friday, expecting to return to work Monday, not hearing
anything about the strength of Katrina and that we were in the path.

Notice was short. We were asked to come in on Saturday and ready our areas.
Only two of us came, others were busy readying their homes. Earlier calls to
ready the campus would have been more effective.
Thus, subthemes that emerged from the comments of a negative nature included
lack of adequate warning time, and lack of any information at all. Many comments
simply stated "nothing." It is unclear if a response of "nothing" is a shorthand of sorts for
"nothing comes to mind," or "did nothing for me." Based strictly on a response to a
direct question, however, the answer must be taken at face value, and thus indicated that
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for some of the participants, a response of "nothing" means "the university did nothing
for me, as an employee, that I found particularly helpful prior to Katrina."
Qualitative Results: Positive Feedback, Post-Katrina
An opportunity for respondents to provide qualitative data regarding perceptions
of USM's actions after Katrina hit is found in question 15 which asked respondents to:
"Please describe anything USM did for you, as an employee, that you found particularly
helpful right after Katrina hit." A total of 327 respondents (38% of survey respondents)
provided comments. The majority of comments (83%) indicated positive perceptions of
action taken by the university after Katrina hit. From the comments of a positive nature
emerged themes of appreciation for the meals, ice and water distributed to employees by
the university, and assurances from the administration of job security.
The following statements are representative of the opinions expressed that were of
a positive nature:
Distribution of ice and water; reassurances to all employees that we would get up
and running as quickly as possible; a strong sense of community concern and
awareness was communicated; a strong sense that everything that could be done
was being done.

I don't remember the date, but it was very encouraging when Thames made the
announcement that everyone would continue to have a job.

Meals at the Commons for employees back at work were a great help.

Meals on GCRL campus, employment security (this was most important, as when
you lose everything, it is reassuring to know you still have a job!)
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Qualitative Results: Negative Feedback, Post-Katrina
However, 56 (17%) comments reflected negative assessments of actions taken by
USM after Katrina hit. The following statements are representative of the opinions
expressed that were of a negative nature:
Nothing. There was no official word from USM. I had to find out from
coworkers when to return to work. I went back to work and my power was about
for another month. I was still eating MREs and trying to teach classes.

I think that people on the Coast figured out a way to communicate. This was a
Coast thing, not a Hattiesburg thing. We found authorities in Hattiesburg just not
able to comprehend our problems and offering utterly stupid solutions. It went
over like a lead balloon when Thames stated at the outside meeting at Long
Beach, with phone lines down that we will put our courses online — what
online?? There was no online capability to most faculty houses for MONTHS. In
fact one third of the faculty was with out even a house for months.

Communications were down, things were chaotic, finally getting word from one
of the graduate students that the lab was still up, everyone was alive was the best
news (but that didn't come from USM, I had no official communication from the
University whatever). USM didn't play any helpful role until they started to
expedite FEMA housing in the National Seashore Park for GCRL employees in
October.
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Very little. So many other organizations (e.g., public schools) received so much
more help than did USM. Even the Red Cross visited the Hattiesburg campus, but
NOT the Gulf Coast campus.
Subthemes that emerged from the comments of a negative nature include frustration with
minimal to total lack of any organized communication from the university; perception of
neglect/disregard for coast-based employees from administration on the Hattiesburg
campus; and inadequate response when assistance was, in fact, given.
Qualitative Results: General Comments
Question 17 gave respondents an opportunity to provide feedback on any topic
relevant to the university's communication during Katrina by asking: "Is there anything
you would like to say about Katrina and USM's response to the hurricane, that has not
been included in this survey? If so, please do so here." A total of 216 respondents (25%
of survey respondents) provided comments. The majority of comments (69%) indicated
positive perceptions, and centered mainly on overall impressions about communication
from the university before and after Katrina.
General Comments, Positive
The following statements are representative of the opinions expressed that were of
a positive nature:
When Katrina hit I had not even been working on campus for a month so I was
not very familiar with the campus and the way in which an emergency would be
handled. However, I know at that time that we did not have an emergency system
in place, so no one was aware what to do in case the hurricane did hit our area.
Since Katrina the University has setup their emergency system and I think it's a
huge step to get information out to as many people as possible about the daily
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functions. I think USM is heading in the right direction of being an effective
communicator to its Faculty, staff and students.

As a whole, I believe the University did the best they could given the situation.
Until something happens for a first time it's hard to imagine what it could be like.
Since then the University has taken many steps to opening up communications
with the Emergency Notification and 2 way radios for certain vital departments. I
feel we still have many areas that can be improved upon for emergency response
but with limited funding it is hard to purchase everything that can be used to help.

I think that much improvement has taken place in communications infrastructure
since Katrina, not just university-related but on a broader basis.

USM stepped up to the plate admirably in a situation none of us, experienced as
we thought we were, ever expected to happen. Due to the relocation of the Gulf
Park campus we were all crammed into very small spaces with few computers and
a few purchased cell phones to share. The feelings of gratitude when seeing
missing coworkers and the adrenaline rush to keep on moving in the face of
disaster created a bond I believe will remain forever. We definitely learned a lot
more about our co-workers and ourselves. A huge upside of the experience was
learning more about how our jobs overlapped as we had to step up and help
students in all situations rather than referring them to whoever normally would
have helped them. We were definitely all in this together.

Southern Miss did an excellent job taking care of students and community
members by opening the cafeteria and making rooms available.
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Responses to the opportunity to give general feedback about any aspect of the
Katrina experience produced positive subthemes focusing on: appreciation for efforts to
offer tangible assistance such as food and ice; a sense of bonding in the face of an
adversary; and appreciation for improved communication, post Katrina.
General Comments, Negative
Of the 216 responses to question 17, 67 (31%) were of a negative nature, and
were, as with the positive comments, focused primarily on communication issues. The
following statements are representative of the opinions expressed that were of a negative
nature:
There was no communication whatsoever for a week or so after Katrina. I have
seen nothing to make me think that USM is better prepared now.

After the storm, it seemed to take FOREVER for the administration to make any
sort of public announcement, or to provide guidance to staff and others. No doubt
much was in fact going on, but communications were poor. Later there seemed to
be an inordinate amount of self-congratulation around how well everything was
handled.
Questions 14, 15 and 17 were consistent in the topics, whether of praise or
criticism, that respondents wanted to convey to the university. These topics include a
continuum of intense gratitude to intense resentment. Gratitude centered primarily on
issues of basic survival: time to prepare for Katrina's arrival; information regarding the
status of the storm; help with food, ice, water and transportation after Katrina; and
appreciation for the fact that no jobs were lost. The opposing points of view centered less
on concrete items - food, clothing, job security - than emotional issues: perceptions of
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lack of regard for costal employees; lack of adequate information after Katrina hit; lack
of assistance with office recovery or relocation; and perceptions that top administrators in
Hattiesburg did not - for some respondents, do not - comprehend the psychological as
well as physical loss some employees suffered.
High Reliability Organization
RQ2 asked: To what degree do employees perceive their employing organization
to be an HRO in the aftermath of a natural disaster-induced crisis? Question 16 allowed
respondents the opportunity to assess the university as a High Reliability Organization.
The survey included the ten High Reliability Organization characteristics as created by
Venette (2003) and adapted for this research project to reflect the nuances of the
organization studied. Reliability was found to be high with Cronbach's alpha of .848;
descriptive statistics for the ten HRO questions are presented in Table 11 (1 = strongly
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neutral, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 =
agree, and 7 = strongly agree). Table 12 lists frequencies, and Table A14, found in
Appendix D, indicates the frequency distribution based on possible total HRO scores
ranging from 10 to 70.
The HRO ranges indicate respondents perceive the university as functioning in a
High Reliability Organization mode at a percentage of 78.3%; 496 of 633 responses fell
into the HRO range of high to very high in perception of the university. This percentage
reflects a solid perception of appropriate crisis response and preparation reliability on the
part of the survey respondents, three years after Katrina hit. Table 13 lists the overall
HRO ranges.
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Table 11
Descriptives for High Reliability Organization Scale
N

Mode

Mean

SD

Range

HROl

682

4

4.09

1.66

6

HR02

676

4

3.93

1.64

6

HR03

675

6

5.08

1.42

6

HR04

674

6

4.72

1.42

6

HR05

670

6

5.00

1.42

6

HR06

676

6

4.91

1.45

6

HR07

676

6

5.05

1.41

6

HR08

676

6

5.47

1.19

6

HR09

680

6

4.68

1.51

6

HRO10

674

4

4.02

1.34

6

Note:

HROl: My opinion/daily operations
HR02: My opinion/long-term planning
HR03: My actions/safeguard
HR04: My actions/influence
HR05: USM/concemed, high risk mistakes
HR06: USM/committed, operations shortcomings
HR07: USM/emphasizes operations
HR08: USM/committed, emergency response shortcomings
HR09: USM supervisors accept my opinion/area of expertise
HRO10: USM oversimplifies info/emergency response procedure
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Table 12
Frequencies for High Reliability Organizations Scale
Strongly
Disagree
N (%)

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree
N (%)

N (%)

Neutral
N (%)

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)

Agree
N (%)

Strongly
Agree
N (%)

Total

HROl

53(7.8%) 105(15.4%)

59(8.7%) 159(23.3%) 141(23.3%) 140(20.5%)

25(3.7%)

682

HR02

61(9.0%) 103(15.2%)

80(11.8%) 165(24.4%) 131(19.4%) 112(16.8%)

24(3.6%)

676

HR03

17(2.5%)

34(5.0%)

21(3.1%) 136(20.1%) 147(21.8%) 234(34.7%)

86(12.7%)

675

HR04

27(4.0%)

37(5.5%)

31(4.6%) 175(26.0%) 175(26.0%) 189(28.0%)

40(5.9%)

674

HR05

14(2.1%)

33(4.9%)

44(6.6%) 134(20.0%) 143(21.3%) 274(33.4%)

78(11.6%)

670

HR06

14(2.1%)

43(6.4%)

58(8.6%) 110(16.3%) 166(24.6%) 217(32.1%)

68(10.1%)

676

HR07

14(2.1%)

36(5.3%)

46(6.8%)

97(14.3%) 166(24.6%) 245(36.2%)

72(10.7%)

676

HR08

5 (.7%)

11(1.6%)

18(2.7%) 105(15.5%) 141(20.9%) 277(41.0%) 119(17.6%)

676

HR09

25(3.7%)

46(6.8%)

59(8.7%) 156(22.9%) 156(22.9%) 178(26.2%)

60(8.8%)

680

18(2.7%)

674

HRO10 28(4.2%)
Note:

62(9.2%) 100(14.8%) 279(41.4%) 100(14.8%)

HROl My opinion/daily operations
HR02 My opinion/long-term planning
HR03 My actions/safeguard
HR04 My actions/influence
HR05 USM/concerned, high risk mistakes
HR06 USM/committed, operations shortcomings
HR07 USM/emphasizes operations
HR08 USM/committed, emergency response shortcomings
HR09 USM supervisors accept my opinion/area of expertise
HRO10: USM oversimplifies info/emergency response procedure

Table 13
High Reliability Organization Ranges
Frequency

Percent

Very Low (10-24)

14

2.2

Low (25-39)

123

19.4

High (41-55)

350

55.3

Very High (56-70)

146

23.1

Total

633

100

87(12.9%)

82

The first HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement
with the following statement: "My opinions are taken into account in the daily operations
at The University of Southern Mississippi (USM)." A mean score of 4.09 with standard
deviation of 1.66 indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this statement.
The second HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement
with the following statement: "My opinions are taken into account in long-term planning
within USM." A mean of 3.93 with a standard deviation of 1.64 indicates that a majority
of respondents do not agree with this statement, though by a slim margin.
The third HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement
with the following statement: "My actions directly contribute to safeguarding USM's
continued existence as a successful university." A mean score of 5.08 with a standard
deviation of 1.42 indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this statement.
The fourth HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement
with the following statement: "My actions influence others to prevent significant
mistakes at USM." A mean score of 4.72 with a standard deviation of 1.42 indicates that
a majority of respondents agree with this statement.
The fifth HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement
with the following statement: "USM is very concerned about the possibility of making
high risk mistakes that would jeopardize the organization." A mean score of 5.0 with a
standard deviation of 1.42 indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this
statement.
The sixth HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement
with the following statement: "USM is committed to correcting shortcomings that could
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jeopardize the organization." A mean score of 4.91 with a standard deviation of 1.45
indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this statement.
The seventh HRO statement asked respondents to indicate their level of
agreement with the following statement: "USM emphasizes maintaining effective
operations." A mean score of 5.05 with a standard deviation of 1.41 indicates a majority
of respondents agree with this statement.
The eighth high reliability statement asked respondents to indicate their level of
agreement with the following statement: "USM is committed to correcting shortcomings
in their emergency response procedures." A mean score of 5.47 with a standard deviation
of 1.19 indicates that a majority of respondents agree with this statement.
The ninth high reliability statement asked respondents to indicate their level of
agreement with the following statement: "USM's supervisors and managers accept an
employee's suggestions about important issues when the employee has particular
expertise in that area." A mean of 4.68 with a standard deviation of 1.51 indicates that a
majority of respondents agree with this statement.
The tenth high reliability statement asked respondents to indicate their level of
agreement with the following statement: "USM often over-simplifies when
communicating about complex emergency response procedures." A mean of 4.02 with a
standard deviation of 1.34 indicates that a majority of respondents agreed with this
statement.
HRO Perceptions and Mediating Factors
RQ3a asked: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a
natural disaster-induced crisis, vary based on years of employment with the organization?
A one-way AN OVA analysis was conducted (M = 3.05, SD = .71) based on length of
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employment, employee work location in relation to the disaster, and pay type. Data
revealed no significant difference based on years of employment (F [3] = 1.63, p = 18).
RQ3b asked: How do employee perceptions of organizational reliability, after a natural
disaster-induced crisis, vary based on employee work location in relation to the disaster?
Data revealed no significant difference based on work location in relation to the disaster
(F [3] = 2.16, p = .09), and RQ3c asked: How do employee perceptions of organizational
reliability, after a natural disaster-induced crisis, vary based on salaried or hourly
employment status? Data revealed that three was no significant difference based on pay
type (F [3] = .09,p = .97). Tables A15, A16 and A17 list the data analyzed and are found
in the appendix.
Summary
Information gleaned from the survey regarding perceptions of information
adequacy both before and after Katrina, particularly as that information related to job
security, paycheck retrieval and return-to-work date, revealed that number of years of
employment is a consistent factor in perception in almost all categories. Specifically,
employees who had worked for two years tended to be less satisfied with information
adequacy across all categories, when compared to all other respondents. However,
longer term employees - those who had worked for the university at least 20 years tended to indicate consistently stronger satisfaction with information adequacy in all
categories.
Qualitative data revealed overall positive perceptions of the university's
interaction with and outreach to employees. In all three sections, regarding information
received prior to Katrina, after Katrina, and general comments, respondents focused on
perceptions of communication efficacy and perceived levels of preparedness by the
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university. Perceptions of pre-Katrina communication fell into general positive
categories of appreciation for employee safety, ample time to attend to employees'
personal and family needs, and attempts to keep employees apprised of the storm's
progress. Generalized negative categories, pre-Katrina, included lack of adequate time to
prepare for the storm, and inadequate information from the university. Perceptions of
post-Katrina communication fell into similar generalized categories of appreciation for
employee well-being in the form of basic supplies such as ice, food and water, and
appreciation for assurances of job security. Negative perceptions included inadequate
communication in any organized manner from the university, as well as a perception that
Hattiesburg-based administrators did not adequately respond with assistance equal to the
need for coastal sites. Reflections regarding pre-Katrina focused on what was conveyed
when, and by whom, while reflections after Katrina also included perceptions of whether
or not employees felt valued and cared for after the storm had hit.
Overall, respondents indicated a strong perception of the university as operating
in a manner consistent with characteristics of a High Reliability Organization. HRO
characteristic #2, which asks for perceptions of individual employee impact long term
organizational planning, is the only characteristic where respondents indicated
disagreement. The rate at which employees reported a perception that the university
functions in a manner consistent with HRO's indicates a solid recovery by the
organization. In particular, the way in which the university communicates operational
readiness, according to respondents, suggests that organizational learning has in fact
occurred in the aftermath of Katrina.
In the next chapter, conclusions, limitations and future research based on this data
will be discussed.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
In the final analysis, this study revealed that the university, in the assessment of
its employees, responded to a natural disaster crisis in a manner consistent with best
practices of high reliability organizations. Further, employees indicated overall positive
perceptions of information adequacy from the university both before and after the
hurricane ravaged south Mississippi. Finally, what differences do exist regarding
information adequacy perceptions are within the power of the organization to effectively
address and adapt in a manner consistent with contemporary organizational crisis
communication theories.
Analysis of the data yields information that sheds insight on the ways in which
organizational communication around the event of a natural disaster crisis is perceived by
employees. Findings reveal what modes of communication are perceived as the most
helpful and, therefore, provide direction for what communicative strategies will prove
most effective. In this chapter, conclusions and implications from the data are addressed,
limitations of the research are discussed, and areas for future research are suggested.
It is worth noting the percentage rate of eligible employees who chose to
participate in the survey. A full 50% of those who were asked to complete the survey did
so. Only one reminder email was sent out, about four weeks after the initial call for
participation, resulting in a percentage of responses that allowed for research findings to
be gleaned from a solid number of participants.
Conclusions from the survey and implications emerging from it fall into three
categories: overall perception of communication from the university with employees
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immediately prior to Katrina; overall perception of communication from the university
with employees up to one month after Katrina hit; and overall perception of the university
as operating in High Reliability Organization mode three years after Katrina. Following
is a summary of each of these categories. Included in the summary by categories are
implications based on the findings. Following is a discussion of limitations of the
research, followed by identification of areas for future research.
High Reliability Organization Assessment
The data that addressed this particular research question indicate a majority of
respondents perceive that the university operates in a manner consistent with nine of the
10 characteristics listed for a high reliability organization. A majority of respondents
indicated some degree of agreement with the following HRO characteristics: employees'
opinions are taken into account in the daily operations of the university; employees'
actions influence others to prevent significant mistakes at USM; employees' actions
directly contribute to safeguarding USM's continued existence as a successful university;
USM is very concerned about the possibility of making high risk mistakes that would
jeopardize the organization; USM is committed to correcting shortcomings that could
jeopardize the organization; USM emphasizes maintaining effective operations; USM is
committed to correcting shortcoming in their emergency response procedures; USM
supervisors and managers accept an employee's suggestions about important issues when
the employee has particular expertise in that area; and lastly, USM does not over-simplify
when communicating about complex emergency response procedures. A finding of 9 out
of 10 HRO practices to be perceived by respondents as part of the university's
operational practice and procedure serves as a solid endorsement of preparedness
perception. Given the enormity of the event that was Katrina, this robust percentage of
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identified HRO characteristics implies that perception among employees that the
university operates in a manner consistent with the best practices of organizations that
operate in crisis readiness, day in and day out. Such a finding is significant in terms of, at
minimum, impressions that the employees who survived Katrina hold about their
employer.
A slim majority of respondents indicated that one characteristic of high reliability
organizations does not accurately describe USM operations. The second HRO states,
"My opinions are taken into account in long-term planning within USM." Assuming that
the university desires to have employees perceive that their opinions are, in fact, taken
into account in long-term planning, organizational learning can again occur if current
opportunities for input are assessed and revised. Such a review would involve a review
of how input is funneled into the more global goals and objectives of the organization, as
well as if and how such input is incorporated at the level of individual units.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) would contend, however, that not all HRO
characteristics must be manifested in an organization's operations for the presence of
HRO practices to be acknowledged. Within this framework one HRO characteristic, with
a relatively close percentage of disagreement by employees, does not negate the strength
of the overall perception of the university as possessing HRO qualities. The parameters
of Weick and Sutcliffe's (2001) research, combined with confirmation of the viability of
HRO characteristics applicability as manifested by Venette's (2003) research, allow for
the conclusion that the organization studied in this research has effectively integrated
HRO characteristics into its daily operations, procedures and practices, as reported by the
respondents who experienced Katrina while in this organization's employ. The
modification of Venette's (2003) HRO scale proved to be satisfactorily applicable to the
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university setting, as evidenced by both feedback from the focus groups and from the
consistency of quantitative data in the survey which addresses HRO characteristics. The
degree to which these HRO attributes were incorporated into the organization's daily
operations and long term planning as a function of organizational learning, however, is a
separate assessment, and is addressed below.
Implications for Communication, Pre-Katrina Quantitative Data
The data reveal rich information regarding what forms of communication proved
to be most useful to employees in the days before Katrina hit. Respondents were asked to
identify which forms of communication they accessed to receive pre-Katrina information.
Respondents were offered communication forms that fall, generally, into three types:
written information directly from the university (email, department memo, and university
website), information disseminated via media (newspaper, TV, radio) and verbal
communication (landline and cell phones; information from co-workers; departmental
meetings). The top three forms of communication utilized by those respondents who did
indicate getting information pre Katrina came from each the three general categories:
email (written), information from co-workers (verbal) and TV (media). Among the
employees who did seek or receive information from the university in the days before
Katrina hit, three forms of communication emerged as the most accessed: information
from co-workers, email, and the university's website, respectively. A total of 45% of
respondents indicated that they received communication about the university from a coworker, while 44% percent of respondents received communication from email. The next
most frequently accessed form of communication pre-Katrina was TV, with 31.8% of
respondents indicating information from this media outlet.
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In no category did a majority of respondents seek or receive information. The
inference one may draw from this fact is based partly in the general comments given
from respondents when asked about their perception of adequacy of information received,
with the timeline of Katrina's arrival in south Mississippi. Until two days prior to the
arrival of the hurricane, most south Mississippians did not realize that Katrina was
scheduled to make landfall in Mississippi. Further, confirmation that the path of the
hurricane was scheduled to make landfall in Mississippi came over the weekend of
August 27, 2005. Almost all university offices were closed and almost all employees
were not on campus. The fact that most employees had left work on Friday, August 26,
2005, with no strong confirmation that Katrina would hit their work sites is a factor that
must be taken into account when assessing organizational communication efforts and also
the interest level by employees to obtain information. The university was, for all
practical purposes, caught off guard by the speed with which imminent danger from
Katrina changed. Consistent with March, Sproull, and Tamuz's (1991) theory that
organization learning occurs infrequently, the university was initially unprepared for true
organizational learning. March et al.'s (1991) theory of organizational learning in
particular acknowledges that organizations, like a public university, do not typically
operate in a state of high-risk alertness. Therefore, the opportunities for organizational
learning are both meager (in frequency) and rich (in learning). Katrina proved to be a
classic example of organizational learning from March et al.'s perspective.
A common theme regarding pre-Katrina communication in the three written
comments sections indicated that some employees did not expect communication from
the university nor did they seek any, because they did not realize that Katrina was headed
their way. It is important to note, then, that the expectation for communication with
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employees from the university may not have been as strong as might be assumed. In
hindsight, the magnitude of Katrina's destruction is enormous. That knowledge
beforehand was far less certain.
The percentage of respondents who indicated agreement that they received
adequate information is almost exactly the same percentage who indicated disagreement.
The uncertainty lies in the percentage of employees who either indicated they could not
recall, felt neutral about the adequacy of information received, or who chose to simply
not answer the question. This level of ambivalence may serve as another illustration of
employee ambiguity about the expectation for communication that was indicated in
written comments. In this sense, Heath's (1997) assertion that moments of crisis - even
impending crisis - are moments for an organization to demonstrate effective
communication, proved to be a mixed result for the university. The implications of
Katrina were not fully realized before the hurricane hit, so the expectation of
communication may not have been fully realized, as well.
The data do show, however, that the perception of information adequacy before
Katrina hit varies according to number of years of employment with the university, work
site location and whether one is paid monthly or bi-weekly. Employees who had worked
at the university for 11 years or less when Katrina hit indicated higher percentages of
dissatisfaction with information adequacy than did employees with 12 to 38 years or
more of employment. Respondents who had been employed by the university for at least
21 years indicated the highest rate of satisfaction with information adequacy before the
hurricane arrived.
Perceptions of pre-Katrina information adequacy also varied according to work
site location. Employees of the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory in Ocean Springs
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indicated a much lower rate of disagreement than did employees of the other three sites.
Employees at Hattiesburg, Long Beach/Gulf Park/Jackson County/Keesler AFB and of
Stennis Space Center reported similar levels of disagreement with information adequacy.
Employees at each site but Gulf Coast Research Laboratory indicated almost evenly split
perceptions of dissatisfaction and satisfaction. Employees of Gulf Coast Research
Laboratory reported much clearer delineation of satisfaction with information adequacy.
Perceptions of pre-Katrina information adequacy also varied according to whether
an employee receives a paycheck monthly (salaried) or bi-weekly (hourly). Salaried
employees reported an almost 20% higher rate of satisfaction with information adequacy
than did employees who receive a bi-weekly paycheck based on an hourly rate of pay.
Hourly employees also indicated a higher percentage of neutral perception about
information adequacy than did salaried employees.
There are implications for what forms of communication were more often
accessed before Katrina hit. Information from co-workers and email emerged as the first
and second most accessed sources of information, respectively, prior to Katrina. The
strength of word-of-mouth as a communication sources indicates that a viable crisis
communication plan for this organization should reflect the usefulness of this person-toperson contact. Weick's (1988) theory of enacted sensemaking is applicable to the
university's pre Katrina endeavors in two key ways. Enacted sensemaking suggests that
people enact the environments that constrain them. In the pre Katrina scenario, reliable
information that is formally shared by the university did not occur in an organized wordof-mouth way. That is to say, not all departments held meetings on the Friday before the
hurricane arrived, not all supervisors engaged in verbal communication with subordinates
to clarify preparation plans, etc. In this void, then, informal word-of-mouth
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communication provided the most accessed form giving and receiving information
relevant to the storm. Additionally, enacted sensemaking is applicable to the pre Katrina
information dissemination scenario in that it was only after the hurricane hit that a need
for a systems approach to the crisis became evident. It is important to bear in mind that a
key factors in pre Katrina communication was the unpredictability of the hurricane's
path, and its arrival on a weekend.
Based on the constraints listed above, a viable communication plan for the
university today would include strategies that recognize the need to clearly articulate
plans, identify to whom the information should be given, and clarify to whom these
designated messengers speak. The high use of email also speaks to the ease and
reliability with which employees turned to this form of communication from their
employer, to seek and receive information. Email use is of primary importance to a large
group of employees, but it must be reiterated that email access is not universal and its
delivery is not predictable. Nevertheless, such an addition to a crisis communication plan
will provide yet further evidence that organizational learning has occurred.
There are also several implications for the findings related to perceptions of preKatrina information adequacy. Employees who had been employed at the university two
years or less may have had more concerns about job security simply because their
experience with the university as an employer was more limited than colleagues with
more years as a university employee. If concerns did exist about job security, newer
employees may have feared a "last hired, first fired" approach if jobs were to be
eliminated. Given the fact that the longer one had worked at the university when Katrina
hit, the more satisfied respondents tended to be, there are implications for the university's
future communication strategies in terms of assurances to newer employees. One may
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also imply that an employees' understanding of how and under what conditions the
university cuts positions increases with the number of years of employment, thus
lowering concern about job loss. In other words, the employer and the employee form a
type of relationship in which the employee feels more certain about ongoing job security
as years with the university accrue.
Coombs' (1995) attribution theory provides a lens through which the perception
differences based on tenure with the organization may be viewed. A key component of
attribution theory in crisis management requires the organization to address the stability
factor. Though Coombs talked about attribution theory from a public image perspective,
the concept applies to organizational communication with employees as well.
Specifically, in the face of a crisis, employees will want to know to what degree the
organization can control the event. Certainly no employee expected the university to be
able to "control" a category 5 hurricane. However, employees with significant time
investment in the university may have come to expect and appreciate that the university
would respond in ways that placed the employees' best interests as a priority.
Implications for Communication, Post-Katrina Quantitative Data
Survey questions gauging perceptions of information adequacy after Katrina
focused on more specific types of information than did questions about pre Katrina
communication adequacy. Three employment-related topics were identified for
individual assessment: job security, paycheck retrieval and return-to-work date.
Respondents were asked to again indicate what communication sources they accessed
after Katrina hit; the list was the same as the pre Katrina list, with one exception. Email
as an option for post Katrina communication was not given, based on feedback from
focus groups that indicated that listing email would indicate that it was a viable option.
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For the vast majority of the focus group participants, email was not, in fact, considered a
viable post-Katrina communication option for up to one month after the hurricane hit.
Data concerning employee perceptions of information adequacy regarding job
security did differ based on work site location. This difference is manifested in the less
than 7% disagreement rate among Gulf Coast Research Laboratory respondents,
compared to the 20% range of disagreement at the other three work site locations.
Perceptions of information adequacy regarding job security did not differ based on
number of years of employment or on pay type.
Data concerning employee perceptions of information adequacy regarding
paycheck retrieval differed based on years of employment and work site location.
Difference based on years of employment illustrates, as with pre Katrina data, that
employees of two years or less when Katrina hit were not in agreement in higher
percentages than other employees, regarding perceptions of adequate information. The
difference was also the same as that described for job security perception regarding
percentage of disagreement among Gulf Coast Research Laboratory respondents,
compared with respondents from the other work site locations. Perceptions of
information adequacy regarding paycheck retrieval did not differ based on pay type.
Data concerning employees perceptions of information adequacy regarding
return-to-work date differed based on years of employment. Respondents with less than
11 years of employment when Katrina hit were in more disagreement with information
adequacy than were employees with 11 or more years. Perceptions of information
adequacy regarding return-to-work date did not differ based on work site location or on
pay type.
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The fact that perceptions of information adequacy regarding job security,
paycheck retrieval and return-to-work date are not impacted in significant ways by
location, years of employment or whether one is paid an hourly rate or salaried serves as
evidence of the implementation of two of Weick and Sutcliffe's (2001, 2007)
characteristics of high reliability organizations. Among the five characteristics of
successful HRO's, the university implemented two in definitive ways. First, they
remained sensitive to operations when they adequately disseminated information about
how employees were to receive paychecks. Further, the fact that paychecks were
distributed, in the face of post hurricane chaos, speaks to the second characteristic, which
is maintaining capabilities for resilience. Assuring that no employee lost a pay period
served as an indication that the university was still functioning and in a manner of
importance to employees: receiving one's paycheck. Maintaining capabilities for
resilience was equally manifested by the fact that a return-to-work date was established,
and information about it appropriately disseminated.
Data also revealed that, in regard to forms of communication accessed, word-ofmouth remained the most frequently used mode, followed by announcements shared with
TV stations. The third most frequently used mode of communication was the university
website. The same general categories of communication mode for the day prior to
Katrina apply for post Katrina: written information directly from the university (email,
department memo, and university website), information disseminated via media
(newspaper, TV, radio) or verbal communication (landline and cell phones; information
from co-workers; departmental meetings). What did change was the medium used for
direct information from the university, with the website receiving the largest percentage
of use during this period, in the absence of email listed as an option for respondents.
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Implications for the organization based on what respondents shared about postKatrina sources of information, coupled with input about specific types of information,
suggest that, as with pre Katrina communication, the respondents with the least number
of employment years disagreed with information adequacy perceptions to a greater
degree than did respondents with at least three years on payroll. This difference may
speak to the uncertainty that a newer employee feels regarding his status with the
university on all levels: job security, how to get paid and when/if to return to work. A
crisis communication plan that provides the university's philosophical stance regarding
job security and payroll assurances, in particular, may alleviate anxiety when the next
natural disaster crisis occurs. If an employee knows beforehand that it is the goal of the
organization to maintain employee numbers and to honor payroll obligations to the
degree feasible during times of crisis, then all employees, regardless of time invested in
the university, may feel a greater sense of security.
As with pre-Katrina communication, respondents from the Gulf Coast Research
Laboratory were, overall, more often in agreement with information adequacy on all
levels than were their counterparts at the other work site locations. The implication for
this phenomenon is not entirely evident. The difference may be a function of their work
site location in relation to where the greatest damage occurred on the coast. It may well
be a function of the intergroup dynamics among employees at this particular site. Further
research exclusively with Gulf Coast Research Laboratory employees could prove to be
an exemplary model of Perrow's (1994) loose coupling theory of organizational structure.
The geographical size of the site, the relatively small number of employees there and the
inevitable crossover of roles in smaller, independent settings may, upon further review,
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determine that this particular component of the larger organization operated effectively
because adjustments could be made, made quickly and to best outcome.
Information shared in written comments enabled a fuller assessment of
communication from the university, both before and after Katrina arrived, to emerge.
Notably, even though the wording of the open-ended questions did not ask that
respondents focus only on communicative interaction from the university,
communication was, in fact, the theme of the majority of comments. Embedded in the
assessments of communication were clues as to the kinds of communication that seemed
to matter the most, and it is this information that holds great potential for organizational
learning. Consistent themes under a general rubric of "communication" included ways in
which the university communicated - or failed to communicate - concern for the
employee's welfare, and that of his family. Adequate opportunity to attend to personal
safety, preparation and recovery were cited as both exemplary and lacking. Though the
majority of comments in each of the three open ended questions were of a positive nature,
up to 30% of comments were not. Yet, the basic theme of communication was
consistent. Thus, the university has an opportunity to review crisis communication
policies and procedures to ensure that not only is adequate preparation and recovery time
afforded to employees, but that assurance of such are effectively communicated to
employees. This organizational accommodation to the need for employees to attend to
basic needs is consistent with Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs, in which food, safety,
protection and care are primary. The acknowledgement of the need to make secure one's
basic needs, as a majority of respondents felt the university did, also speaks to Mitroff et
al.'s (1987) insistence that attending to employees' coping mechanisms enhances the
efficacy of a systems approach in crisis management.
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Implications for Communication from Qualitative Data
An equally important opportunity for organizational learning emerged from
written comments regarding those actions taken by the university that communicated to
employees concern for basic survival needs. In this broad category, employees
commented on their gratitude for ice, water and food provided by the university after the
hurricane had left massive devastation. A message of care and concern for employee
well-being that was communicated through actions turned out to be as powerful to
employees as what was communicated verbally and in writing. Thus, the university has
the opportunity to further enrich its natural disaster communication plan by formalizing
and planning for outreach efforts that reinforce the desire to see that basic employee
needs are met, to the degree possible. These acts of assistance from the university can be
analyzed in light of Seeger and Ulmer's (2002, 2003) research, as concrete examples of
integrating an organization's moral imperative to respond in an ethical manner with
employees during times of crisis. Technically, the university as employer had no legal
responsibility to ascertain if employees needed food, water, ice, clothing or shelter.
However, the university chose to assume this caretaker role and in doing so, made a
statement of investment in employees that is consistent with the ethical imperative
suggested by Seeger and Ulmer.
Further, the qualitative data served to confirm the use of impression management
strategies as described by Allen and Caillouet (1994). The university, they would
maintain, actively engaged in behavior that would reinforce for employees the
organization's viability. The clear, emphatic declaration that no jobs would be lost may
be the single most definitive moment in the university's impression management efforts
after Katrina. Having the chief executive officer of the university stated publicly and
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with no ambiguity that the university would re-open and no paychecks would be missed,
constituted a symbolic gesture while simultaneously serving as a needed reassurance to
employees.
Organizational Learning Assessment
A key objective of this study was to determine if organization learning occurred
for this organization in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Further, this research project
sought to ascertain whether or not organizational learning was manifested to the degree
that employees perceive the organization as utilizing, post crisis, characteristics of high
reliability organizations. Based upon the parameters of organizational learning as
presented in chapter two, the results are mixed.
To the degree that Seeger and Ulmer's (2003) criteria for organizational learning
are applied, the university did engage in active organizational learning on at least one
level. The university accommodated experience, it can be argued, based on how
employees perceive the university, post Katrina. The assessment in both the qualitative
feedback and in the rating of the university as adopting nine of the ten HRO
characteristics lends credence to the assertion that experience provided lessons, and the
organization adapted accordingly. By whatever means the university did so, it has
created what can safely be interpreted, based on the survey, as an organization in which
its employees believe management operates in a manner alert for, and ready to respond,
to crisis. What cannot be adequately assessed by this study is the degree to which
information was accommodated by the university. One may presume that information
gleaned from experience was accommodated, but it is only a presumption. The study did
not include a pre-Katrina assessment of HRO characteristics; therefore, reliable analysis
of the degree to which information was absorbed cannot be statistically verified.
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Based on Cohen and Sproull's (1996) three pronged test for organizational
learning one may conclude that the university did engage in organizational learning by at
least two of the three criteria. The learning gleaned created knowledge that is manifested
in procedure, as is evidenced by employee perceptions of HRO characteristics; the results
of the learning are, based on the data, retained among interactions within the
organization, again evidenced by perceptions of HRO characteristics; and the learning
may have provoked change. This final criteria, as stated earlier, cannot be statistically
ascertained because no pre-Katrina perception among employees of HRO organizational
functionality does not exist.
Further Implications
This research contributes to the body of knowledge regarding organizational crisis
communication in that it successfully applies, for appropriate analysis, theoretical
frameworks that typically are not used for internal organizational communication in times
of crisis. More specifically, this research illustrates the applicability of crisis
communication theories, originally designed for man-made crises, to natural disaster
crises where human error cannot be assigned. This contribution enriches the small body
of research available regarding communication with one's employees, not one's public
constituents, in the face of natural disaster crisis. Examples of external crisis
communication strategies applied to internal crisis communication endeavors are offered
below.
Impression management theory, established by Allen and Caillouet (1994) proved
to be a viable theory for analysis of intra-organizational communication, not just to one's
public stakeholders. Impression management requires that the organization become an
intentional actor in shaping - or even re-shaping - its image. Allen and Caillouet
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envisioned impression management as a strategy for arguing an organization's ongoing
viability in the face of man-made crisis. In this manner, organizational legitimacy
required the implementation of apologia, an attempt to repair damaged image. Further,
the organization attempts to re-establish the positive impressions of the organization held
by the public prior to the crisis.
It is this particular component of impression management, more so than apologia,
that proved to be effective and applicable to this instance of internal organizational crisis
communication. When the university president spoke clearly and publicly from the back
of a pick up truck to a group of employees who had lost all semblance of normal life, he
successfully employed attributes of impression management in two significant ways.
First, he assured the ongoing viability of the organization by declaring that the university
would reopen and that jobs would not be eliminated. And, he called upon the assumption
that these employees to whom he spoke trusted that the university would "make good" on
its word, that an assurance of ongoing viability held legitimacy for them. Based upon
what both the qualitative and quantitative data revealed, this assumption was a correct
one. He was able to call upon the perceptions employees held prior to the crisis and
reinforce the assurance that while homes, offices and a sense of safety were now gone,
employment with a still-viable organization remained.
To some degree, Coombs' (1995) attribution theory was also enacted when the
university president made his on-site pronouncement that the university would remain
open and jobs would not be lost. Attribution theory is grounded in the concept that, as
with impression management, a reframing of the crisis must be offered so that the public
has an alternative way in which to view the organization, post crisis. It is true that the
natural disaster crisis which was Katrina did not require an explanation per se from the
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organization. For example, there was no need to assign blame for the hurricane, and no
need to deny its existence. Yet, when the continued viability of the university and the
continued employment was assured by the president, he invited employees to consider
the crisis through two new perspectives.
The first perspective utilized the element of minimizing, a key component of
attribution theory. Minimizing allowed the president to assure employees that things
were not as bad as they may seem, in that jobs would not be lost. The other key
component of attribution which the president used is ingratiation; in this instance, in the
form of bolstering. Again, perceptions shared by survey participants in both qualitative
and quantitative data confirm that this assurance provided a bolstering morale for the
coast employees in particular, who were facing almost total devastation.
In similar fashion, this case study also confirms that the concept of high reliability
organizations and the characteristics of them as described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001,
2007) can be successfully applied to a non-profit organization, an educational
organization and a multi-site organization, separately or, as is the case of this study, all
three components in one organization. True, Venette (2003) successfully applied HRO
characteristics to a non-profit agency - in his study, a branch of the United States
Department of Agriculture which works with risk assessment scenarios at United States
ports. Thus, in terms of applicability of HRO characteristics to a non profit organization,
this study only adds further confirmation of the viability based on that characteristic.
What makes this study's contribution to the field of organizational crisis communication
noteworthy, however, is that, unlike the kind of government organization that Venette
(2003) surveyed, a public university such as the one surveyed for this study does not
typically operate in an environment of high risk.
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The applicability of high risk organizations to a low risk educational environment
confirms that organizational learning, as espoused by Seeger and Ulmer (2003), can
occur by combining experience with information. This particular university chose to
combine the experiences gained from a crisis like Katrina and learn from it via
information gathered from employees. The information gathered speaks to high
reliability practice perception of the organization by its employees. This study illustrates
the applicability and even the practicality of organizational learning when assessed
through the lens of high reliability organizational practices. In this context, then, the
contribution to the field is a strong one. It verifies that HRO characteristics can, in fact,
provide a model for improving practices, procedures and even perceptions for
organizations that do not operate in a daily high risk environment but which nevertheless
are vulnerable on a daily basis to some kind of risk.
Limitations

jH§k

This study presents results with limitations. As with all research, the limitations
that create the boundaries of the research must be identified and factored into the
significance of the outcomes. The limitations of this particular project are identified here.
This study focused on only one organization among hundreds of organizations
that faced communication issues, post-Katrina. While one strength of the research may
be the in-depth analysis that results from a case study's intense examination of one
organization, it also limits the options for comparison. Applicability to other
organizations, therefore, may be limited. The size of the organization, the number of
employees and the numerous work site locations may confound the relationship or
usefulness of the data to smaller organizations.
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This study is also constrained by the time lapse between the time of Hurricane
Katrina in August 2005 and the distribution of the survey in December 2008. Three years
have passed since Katrina hit the university campuses. The potential for faded memories
or even no recollection at all may play a factor in outcomes. Similarly, the usefulness of
the data collected is somewhat limited because no pre-Katrina survey of employees'
perceptions of organizational communication practices had been administered. The data
regarding efficacy of communication practices would have resulted in a potentially more
robust outcome had the communicative efforts after Katrina been measured against preKatrina perceptions prior to August 2005.
The survey is also limited in that a stringent comparison of employee perceptions
of communication could not realistically be assessed between the time period of one
week prior to Katrina and one week after Katrina. Feedback gleaned from focus groups
confirmed that so little communication was possible in the week following Katrina that,
by necessity, a wider time period needed to be allowed for true assessment of postKatrina communicative efforts. Further, the categories of immediate needs regarding
communication after Katrina also emerged from the focus groups. The groups clarified
that a general assessment of employee perception of adequacy of information shared
would not capture helpful information. Rather, the focus groups urged the assessment of
three key employee concerns in the weeks immediately following Katrina: job security,
assurances of regular paycheck distribution and information regarding when to return to
work. Therefore, though useful, these specific areas of information make a true
comparison with wider general perceptions of pre-Katrina communication adequacy
more difficult.
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A change in leadership at the highest levels of the organization, between the time
that the hurricane hit until the distribution of the survey, may have limited the accurate
assessment of organizational communication as it was implemented from the highest
levels. The university president in office when Katrina hit in 2005 had retired from his
post eighteen months before the distribution of the survey. Wood (1999) demonstrated
the vital role of the charisma and communicative ability of a university president in her
research regarding internal communication channels in higher education. Thus, changes
in presidential leadership and accompanying changes in communication styles may have
impacted employee perceptions of crisis communication readiness. Similarly, Hwang
and Cameron (2009) determined that the perception of the person conveying information
to an organization in times of crisis - and that person typically is the chief executive
officer - does impact the perception of the severity and meaning of the crisis to recipients
of the message.
Effective communication from an organization under the leadership of a new
president may color respondents' perceptions and memories of communication from the
organization as it occurred under previous presidential leadership at the time of the
hurricane. The qualitative data gleaned from the survey's open-ended questions indicated
that a noteworthy percentage of those who provided written comments (up to 30% of the
comments) indicated frustration-to-anger with communication from the university, via
the administration, at that time. On the other hand, the HRO scale questions asked
respondents to focus only on their current perceptions of the university. Responses
indicated a strong perception of a university that operates in a manner consistent with
HRO organizations. The change in variable of leadership must be noted as a limitation of
this study. The communication at the time of the hurricane fell to the responsibility of a
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previous president; the current president inherited post-Katrina communication channels
to create and refine.
Massey and Larson (2006) researched the impact of management response to
crisis in which the issue of credibility of the crisis management team, a team designated
by the organization's chief officer. Their study confirmed that the crisis plan itself is only
as effective as the perception of the team that enacts it. In their study, the management
team, spearheaded by top management, was able to effectively engage in crisis
management in part because employees and the public both perceived the leadership team
to be credible. The absolute necessity of respected leadership at the top, particularly
during times of crisis, was reinforced by Schoenberg (2005) when he employed the
phrase "reputation management" to describe that key credibility issue of the Chief
Executive Officer. The degree that perceptions of communication efficacy right before
and right after Katrina are different when compared with perceptions at the time of the
survey distribution cannot be appropriately measured based on the data at hand. Thus,
the impact of perceptions of president leadership in during this particular crisis may limit
the scope of final analysis.
Lack of input from former employees who were employed by the university when
Katrina hit also limits a full picture of information adequacy perception. Because this
group was not surveyed, we cannot fully know of two key factors. First, we cannot
ascertain what their perceptions were, and thus have a more robust assessment of
information adequacy. Equally important, too, is the uncertainty regarding to what
degree, if any, the hurricane and the university's response to it impacted the factors that
led to employment separation on the part of these former employees.

Finally, a clearly agreed-upon definition of what is meant by "USM" when
completing the survey was, likely, not possible among respondents. Assumption of this
limitation is based upon focus group feedback in which much discussion ensued
regarding "whom" or "what" is USM: is it the university as a whole? The administration
at the Hattiesburg campus? An employee's individual work site location? It was
determined that for the purposes of treating the university as an HRO, the term would
remain undefined in any way other than "The University of Southern Mississippi."
Therefore, the risk exists that respondents' feedback varied based on differing
perceptions of what "the university" means, by what is included in the concept of "the
university."
On the other hand, this confusion may not, in fact, truly be confusion. It may
instead serve as an example of Seeger's (2002) chaos theory in action. Seeger
maintained that a natural disaster crisis is actually the perfect venue for chaos theory to
be enacted. When usual forms of communication break down, when traditional forms of
leadership are unavailable or inaccessible, chaos theory posits that persons in
organizations re-group and create a new reality, at least for the duration of the crisis
event. Viewed in this way, the failure of "USM" as Hattiesburg guided organization in
the eyes of some coastal employees, allowed for new alliances. Certainly, the strong
sense of unity among the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory would speak to an enactment
of chaos theory. And, despite perceptions among some Gulf Park employees of
abandonment by Hattiesburg, new campus alliances among that group, perhaps, formed
and functioned in a leadership void.
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Suggestions for Future Research
Limitations of the research can logically point the way toward topics for future
research. For example, more specific information regarding employee perceptions of
HRO practices may emerge if each work site location were surveyed, with questions
posed to employees at each site, specific to each location. Such information could help
identify strengths and weaknesses of each site, and lead to improved communication
system-wide. Data from respondents who work at the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory
suggest that further feedback from that particular employee group may yield information
about to what degree and how Seeger's (2002) chaos theory was implemented
effectively. Why did employees at this site ultimately report lower levels of
dissatisfaction with university communication efforts than did their colleagues at other
sites? The data suggests that the degree to which this particular work site regrouped after
the hurricane hit may be a factor of chaos theory in action. This perception can be
verified through follow-up surveys, at all sites, that incorporate elements of chaos theory.
Such a site-by-site survey may yield data that can inform the potential need for
stronger communicative ties between sites. Individual site surveys for "best practices"
may be especially helpful at the Gulf Coast Research Laboratory, since perceptions of
information adequacy among employees there, particularly after Katrina hit, tended to be
higher than their coastal colleagues working at other sites. Subjecting the Gulf Coast
Research Laboratory to further analysis would prove consistent with Heath's (1997)
research, indicating the need for organizations to demonstrate a commitment to
heightened attention to communication, and to responsibly make adjustments in the
aftermath of crisis.
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Further research exclusively with Gulf Coast Research Laboratory employees
could prove to be an exemplary model of Perrow's (1994) loose coupling theory of
organizational structure. The geographical size of the site, the relatively small number of
employees there and the inevitable crossover of roles in smaller, independent settings
may, upon further review, determine that this particular component of the larger
organization operated effectively because adjustments could be made, made quickly and
to best outcome.
Further research opportunities also exist with a closer examination of word-ofmouth communication channels, based on the reported strength of this type of
communication, both before and after Katrina. Billings, Milburn and Schaalman (1980),
almost three decades earlier, identified the need for employers to lessen the opportunity
for employee emotional inoculation to set in by ever anticipating and revising
communication strategies. The more information an employee has, the less likely he is to
experience emotional inoculation, a form of stress and anxiety that can cause emotional
paralysis. Since word-of-mouth forms of communication proved to be the most effective
for employees both before and after Katrina hit, the university will benefit from more
detailed, thorough information about how the verbal channels emerged. Kiger (2001)
spoke to the need for relying on unconventional communication methods after the World
Trade Center crisis and foretold the Katrina crisis of no technology available to use for
communication. More in-depth survey of the various kinds of word-of-mouth
communication may prove beneficial as the university assesses current crisis
communication plans. More information about what persons or organizations served as
the conduit for word-of-mouth communication may yield heretofore underutilized
sources. For example, word-of-mouth information may be transmitted in certain
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formalized settings, such as places of worship or through civic organizations. An indepth study of word-of-mouth communication may determine that more employees get
information in this mariner from co-workers than supervisors, or from neighbors. The
source of the verbal communication may, ultimately, inform the veracity of the
information shared.
The university should consider surveying those former employees who were on
payroll when Katrina hit. Determining to what degree the hurricane prompted their
separation from the university would potentially strengthen the usefulness of the survey.
More specifically, the university has the potential to gain insight into whether or not the
university's communicative responses to the hurricane impacted the circumstances that
led to the employees' separation from the organization.
Further research is also warranted in the area in which employees indicated
disagreement with high reliability organizational practices. With feedback from the
survey indicating that a majority of respondents do not feel that individual input is
routinely taken into account in organizational long term planning, follow up research
with this organization may reveal to what degree and in what manner this perception is
being communicated. Consistent with Pearson and Mitroffs (1993) research confirming
the correlation between an organization's acknowledgment of the expertise of employees
with their sense of personal accountability when the organization faces crisis, the
university will benefit from follow up research on this particular HRO characteristic.
Failure to further examine this perception by employees may cause employees to engage
in what Novak (2006) described as benign mindlessness. This phenomenon occurs when
employees feels their opinions do not matter; therefore, they becomes less likely to
maintain a mindful approach to work practices and procedures. Thus, an in-depth follow
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up within the university may, in turn, result in meaningful application for similar
organizations, particularly organizations that are engaged in nonprofit endeavors.
Overall, more case studies of organizations affected by Katrina, such as institutions of
higher education, non profit agencies, and for profit businesses, will enrich the data
currently available about effective communication practices in natural disaster crises. The
variety of organizational goals, sizes and locations will provide more depth of insight.
Final Summary
Organizations cannot control the occurrence of natural disasters. Within their
control, however, is how they communicate with their constituents before, about and after
such a disaster. This study has provided a basis from which organizations can compare
and assess what they want to communicate to that crucial stakeholder, the employee. In
times of natural disaster, what is communicated internally within an organization is as
important as what is conveyed to the public. Scholars in the communication field have an
opportunity to enhance the practice of effective organizational communication with
employees. This kind of practical application of systematic inquiry partners the
academician with the administrator. The end result may not only ensure the survival of
the organization in times of hurricane, tornado, flood or other natural disasters, but do
likewise for employees.

113
\

APPENDIX A
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD MATERIALS

TO:
FROM:

USM Institutional Review Board
ebecca N. Woodrick

DATE:

November 17, 2008

RE:

Request for Approval to Survey

Statement of Project Goals:
The goal of this project is to assess perceptions of communication efficacy between The
University of Southern Mississippi (USM) and its employees when Katrina hit during
August 2005. The information used will serve as the basis for feedback to the university
as it updates its Crisis Communication Plan.
Protocol Information
A survey will be distributed to current USM employees who were on payroll during
August 2005. A total of 1700 employees will be invited to participate in the survey.
The survey will be distributed both online and in print. A private entity has been selected
to collect the data online, thus reducing the opportunity for participants to be identified
based on port. Handwritten surveys will be available upon request, and will be sent with
pre-addressed return envelopes.
The survey will take no more than 15 minutes to complete. A copy of the survey is
attached. It is titled "Employee Perceptions of Communication from The University of
Southern Mississippi during Hurricane Katrina." Also attached is a copy of the request to
President Martha D. Saunders, which she approved. Verbal support of the survey was
also given by President Saunders in a meeting in which Professor John Meyer was
present on September 19, 2008.
Participants in the survey will be 18 years of age or older.
Benefits
This project has the potential to:
© Allow employees to give feedback that will assist in adopting a
useful and informed Crisis Communication Plan for the institution;
• Allow the university to assess what went well and what needs
improvement regarding internal communication with employees,
particularly during time of natural disaster crisis.

114

Risks
This project has the potential to elicit in respondents reactions to memories of hurricane
Katrina. The survey itself will contain information regarding how to access counseling
services should they feel the need to do so.
Confidentiality of the process will be promised in written.form when the request-toparticipate email or letter is sent. It is reiterated in the introductory remarks of the
survey.
The data will be retained by The Group Decision Center in Fargo, ND until the principal
investigator requests that it be destroyed. All written copies of the survey will be
shredded after the data has been entered into the online survey.
Informed Consent
A wavier of the consent form is requested. The vast majority of participants will take the
survey online, the submission which will indicate agreement to participate. Further, both
online and written survey forms will indicate (1) the nature of the survey (2) the
confidentiality of the information shared and (3) ways to access assistance should
emotional issues emerge from having participated in the survey.
Attachments: Permission to survey employees
Survey
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THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI
Institutional Review Board

118 College Drive #5147
Hattiesburg, MS 39406-0001
Tel: 601.266.6820
Fax: 601.266.5509
www.usm.edu/irb

HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTION REVIEW COMMITTEE
NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION
The project has been reviewed by The University of Southern Mississippi Human Subjects
Protection Review Committee in accordance with Federal Drug Administration regulations
(21 CFR 26,111), Department of Health and Human Services (45 CFR Part 46), and
university guidelines to ensure adherence to the following criteria:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

The risks to subjects are minimized.
The risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits.
The selection of subjects is equitable.
Informed consent is adequate and appropriately documented.
Where appropriate, the research plan makes adequate provisions for monitoring the
data collected to ensure the safety of the subjects.
Where appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and
to maintain the confidentiality of all data.
Appropriate additional safeguards have been included to protect vulnerable subjects.
Any unanticipated, serious, or continuing problems encountered regarding risks to subjed
must be reported immediately, but not later than 10 days following the event. This should
be reported to the IRB Office via the "Adverse Effect Report Form".
If approved, the maximum period of approval is limited to twelve months.
Projects that exceed this period must submit an application for renewal or continuation.

PROTOCOL NUMBER: 28111702
PROJECT TITLE: Assessment of Communication With Employees During
Hurricane Katrina
PROPOSED PROJECT DATES: 11/25/08 to 03/25/09
PROJECT TYPE: Dissertation or Thesis
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS: Rebecca Nell Woodrick
COLLEGE/DIVISION: College of Arts & Letters
DEPARTMENT: Speech Communication
FUNDING AGENCY: N/A
HSPRC COMMITTEE ACTION: Expedited Review Approval
PERIOD OF APPROVAL: 11/24/08 to 11/23/09

Lawrence A. Hosman, Ph.D.
HSPRC Chair

Date
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HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW F O R M
UNIVERSITY O F SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI

Protocol #
(office use only)

(SUBMIT THIS FORM IN DUPLICATE)
Name

R e b e c c a Nell Woodrick

E-Mail Address

re eccawooc

b

Phone 601.266.6804

'rick@usm.edu

Mailing Address Box 5168, USM
(address to receive information regarding this application)

Coiiege/Divlsion

CQAL

Department Box # 5131
Proposed Project Dates: Frorri 11/25/08

Dept_

Speech Communication

Phone 6^271
T o

03/25/09

(specific month, day and year of the beginning and ending dates of full project not just data collection)

Title

ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA

Funding Agencies or Research Sponsors
Grant Number (when applicable)
New Project
_^

Dissertation or Thesis
Renewal or Continuation: Protocol #
Change in Previously Approved Project: Protocol #_

M-IT-.0S
Principal Investigator

•rf\H~

•£^¥- T^^i

Date
Date
Dat6

RECOMMENDATION OF HSPRC MEMBER
Category I, Exempt under Subpart A, Section 46.101 ( ) ( ), 45CFR46.
Category II, Expedited Review, Subpart A, Section 46.110 and Subparagraph &>).
Category III, Full Committee Review.

HSPRC College/DMsion Member

DATE

HSPRC Chair

DATE
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THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI
Office of Affirmative Action and Equal
Emblement Opportunity
„
"

118 College Drive #5168
jurg, MS 39406-0001
Hattiesburg,
39406O001
601.266.6618
www.usm.edu/aa-eeo

TO:

. President Saunders

FROM:

l y

-

Becky Woodrick

DATE:

September 19, 2008

RE:

Research request

I request permission to survey current USM employees who were also on payroll in
August 2005, as the basis for my dissertation research associated with my pursuit of a
speech communication doctoral degree here at Southern. My area of concentration in
the program is organizational crisis communication.
My goal is to assess employee impressions of the quantity and quality of
communication they had with the university, as their employer, during the crisis that was
hurricane Katrina. Access will take two forms: multiple focus group interviews and an
online survey (hard copies will be available upon request). I have chosen this topic
because little research exists regarding how to effectively communicate, in times of
natural disaster crisis, with an organization's employees. They are, arguably, the most
important stakeholder group within an organization. Yet in-depth analysis of and
detailed framework for natural disaster communication crisis with employees is curiously
absent from the literature.
Participation in the survey will be entirely voluntary, and employee identity will be kept
confidential. The confidentiality of all participants would be maintained in a final report
given to you on the findings of the survey. As you are well aware, this degree of
confidentiality is crucial to the success of the survey.
I request from you the following:
»
•

Your written approval to Human Resources, so I may use the above-described
employee group (approximately 1700 persons) for my survey group;
Access to the university's communication crisis plan that was implemented in
August 2005, as well as the current plan.

Potential benefits to USM for having allowed me survey these employees include:
«

•

A statistical and organizational analysis of employees satisfaction with the
communication they received from the university during and after hurricane
Katrina (this information can be used to confirm efficacy and/or provide feedback
on how to improve upon communication);
Potential for positive public recognition as a case study in organizational
communication with employees in times of crisis;
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•

A summary presentation of the findings, both written and verbal, to you and other
university administrators of your choosing.

The degree to which the university may choose to remain anonymous in the publication
of the dissertation, and in any subsequent research based on the dissertation, is entirely
at your discretion.
My goal is to conduct the survey no later than the end of this semester.
Thank you for your consideration of this request.
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REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN FOCUS GROUP AND SURVEY

On 11/5/08 2:48 PM, "Becky Woodrick" <rebecca.woodrick@,usm.edu>
wrote:
Good afternoon!
I write to ask for your help. I've created a survey, as a part of my speech
communication doctoral research project, which will gather information
about USM's communication with employees during hurricane Katrina. I
seek employees, from all corners of the campus community, to help "test
drive" the survey. You will be asked to complete a survey, and then devote
one hour on Wednesday, November 19 (12:10 p.m. t o 12:50 p.m.), to give
me feedback about the survey, i will provide you lunch if you will give me
your feedback!
If you can spare 15 minutes to fill out the survey, and then bring it with you
Dr. Joachim's conference room on 11/19, I will be most grateful. If need
be, I can request release time from your supervisor so you can participate .
in the meeting. Your survey, as well as your feedback, will remain
confidential.
FYI, your fellow employees at GCRL and at the Hattiesburg will have the
same opportunity, on November 17 and 19.
If you are willing to assist, please send me an email or call me at 601-2666804. I will see that you get a copy of the survey early next week, and ask
that you bring it with you or+the 19th.
Questions? Give me a call.
Thanks much,
Becky Woodrick
Southern Miss AA/EEO Director
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http://thinktank.groupsystems. com/opinio/s?s=45 8 7

ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of
Southern Mississippi
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey! Your feedback will remain confidential, and will be used not only for
the purposes of this dissertation research project, but to aid the university in updating crisis communication efforts during
natural disasters. W h e n you complete and send this survey you will, by default, give your permission to participate in this
survey, which has been approved by The University of Southern Mississippi's Human Subjects Protection Review
Committee, Questions or concerns about this survey can be shared with Becky Woodrick by calling 601.266-6804;
dissertation committee chair Dr. John Meyer at 601.266.4280; or by contacting the chair of the USM Institutional Review
Board, 118 College Ave, Box 5147, Hattiesburg MS 39406 or by calling 601-266.6820.
If your participation in this survey should create issues or concerns of a personal nature, you are invited to contact the
director of the university's counseling center, Ms. Deena L. Crawford, for information regarding counseling referrals. Ms.
Crawford can be reached by calling 601.266.4829.
First, please provide some basic information about yourself:
_j>tart j
Powered by Opinio

1 of 1

4/m/?nno in-?n A M
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ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of
Southern Mississippi
Please tell me about yourself:
1. Work location in August 2005:
;;i Guif Coast Research Laboratory fT; Stennis Space Center O Hattiesburg
•0 Long Beach/Gulf Park Campus
~> Jackson County site
C > Keesler AFB

2

- # of years you have worked for USM:

3

- I am:
:;! Staff (n Administrator (academic and non academic) :':• Faculty

4

- I am paid:
-C> Bi-weekly 0j Monthly

5- My gender is:
:n Female fj Male

6- My race is (Check all that apply):
f^j White ;f?.i Afican-American I E Hispanic/Latino [O Native American O Asian

?• My age is:
018-25

©26-35

@ 36-45 ©46-55 ffi 56-65 ' © 66-75 -Q 76 or better

8- Prior to Katrina, I had experienced a hurricane(s):
>:.> No : 0 Yes (please list which one(s) & date(s):

47%

j^extj
Powered by Opinio

1 r,f 1

A It A l^f\r\f\

i n . 1 1 A "h A
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ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of
Southern Mississippi
AS YOU THINK ABOUT YOUR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THIS SURVEY, THINK ABOUT USM AS A MULTI-SITE
UNIVERSITY. IN OTHER WORDS, GIVE ANSWERS THINKING OF USM AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST IN TERMS OF THE
CAMPUS WHERE YOU WORK.
PARTI

When answering these questions, please think about your time at USM as an employee, and respond based on your job
role/responsibilities at Southern Miss:
9
- Where/how did you receive information directly from USM: (check all that apply)
One Week Before Katrina
r^F

-.

f^l u^M website
—^Departmental
"""
meeting
F-i Announcements from USM given [H Landline
'
to Newspapers)
telephone

:

ir^J Announcements from USM given
toRadioStation(s)
•I'D Others (please describe here)

^Departmental
£ j Announcements from USM given
memo
to TV station(s)
^ « „ ,_
,
(---T , t ,
0 Cell phone
fc]
Info from co-workers

10. ONE WEEK BEFORE KATRINA HIT:
USM provided me, as an employee, with adequate information about Katrina:
0 Strongly Disagree £s Disagree © Somewhat Disagree £3 Neutral 0 Somewhat Agree ® Agree 0 Strongly Agree 0 Can't Recall

11 UP TO ONE MONTH AFTER KATRINA:
Where/how did you receive information directly from USM:(check all that apply)
;==*.. . „ . .
"J

, .j

[ 0 Departmental
meeting

W\ Announcements from USM given F l Landline
— , ...
, ,
—. , .
to Newspaper(s)
telephone

W} Departmental
memo
^
' .. ,
(LJCel rphone

|rj Announcements from USM given [T] Announcements from USM given
to TV station(s)
to Radio station(s)
,_
[vj nfo from co-workers
•—

64%

£J Others (please describe here)

_Next
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survey

ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of
Southern Mississippi
A REMINDER: AS YOU THINK ABOUT YOUR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN THIS SURVEY, THINK ABOUT USM
AS A MULTI-SITE UNIVERSITY. IN OTHER WORDS, GIVE ANSWERS THINKING OF USM AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST
IN TERMS OF THE CAMPUS WHERE YOU WORK.
PART II
12. Think back to the two week immediately after Katrina hit, and answer the following questions based on your opinion at
that time:
Strongly
Disagree

i Disagree: Somewhat

USM provided me, as an employee, with adequate
information about my job status/security, after Katrina hrt:
USM provided me, as an employee, with adequate
information about receiving my next paycheck, after Katrina .
hit:
USM provided me adequate information about when to
return to work, after Katrina hit:

70%
Powered by Opinio

•Neutral)

S

T ! W h a t ;Agree|
Agree

Simn

^
Agree

'

Can

'»
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ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of
Southern Mississippi
PART III
13

- I participated in the following USM activities, after hurricane Katrina: (Check all that appiy)
!£] free food offered on my campus
£Z}on-campus pick-up of my regularly scheduled paycheck
E j meeting with Dr. Joachim at the Long Beach high school
Ll; meeting with President Thames/Or. Joachim at the Long Beach high school
Cil convocation with President Thames on the Hattiesburg campus
Itlj helped with repair of employees' homes damaged by the hurricane
tiB received help from USM employee(s) with repairs to my home/office
E'j received temporary housing from USM
t j received clothes, food, cleaning supplies, etc from USM-affiliated groups
•Li Other (please describe here)

14- Please describe anything USM did for you, as an employee, that you found particularly helpful right before Katrina hit:

15. Please describe anything USM did for you, as an employee, that you found particularly helpful right after Katrina hit:

88%
Powered by Opinio
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ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES DURING HURRICANE KATRINA The University of
Southern Mississippi
PART IV
When answering these questions, please think about your years/experience at USM as an employee, and respond based on
your job role/responsibilities. Think in general terms, not just about Katrina issues:
16. please click the option that best corresponds to your opinion:
! r ? r ° n g , y "Disagreed
a
; Disagree .
;
..,..
....

; My opinions are taken into account in the daily operations at The

Somewhat
Disagree

\
.

s

Somewhat :
Agree
:.

'':J

'•-•'

'•-•'

'''•-•

'••:'

;~\

f\

••-';

p.

,>"-*,

JMy actions directly contribute to safeguarding USM's continued

..,

.-,

^

-.existence as a successful university.

''-:

^University of Southern Mississippi (USM).
;My opinions are taken into account in long-term planning within USM.

;

;My actions influence others to prevent significant mistakes at USM.
:USM is very concerned about the possibility of making high risk
5 mistakes that would jeopardize the organization.
.-USM is committed to correcting shortcomings that could jeopardize the ;

\

v

-"'

'"-'

'---1

,; J

.;--:-,

f-\

.••:)

,»-;,

...
'-•'

......
'- J

^organization.

'•"--'

:, ;

--

'

:USM emphasizes maintaining effective operations.

,f-,

(~)

,y-}

!

.„_
'•-'"

^
''-*'

...
'•"-'•'

USM is committed to correcting shortcomings in their emergency
; response procedures.
jUSM's supervisors and managers accept an employee's suggestions
;about important issues when the employee has particular expertise in
• that area.
;USM often over-simplifies when communicating about complex
'.emergency response procedures.

^

$•';.

C-\

,r.
'"-'•'

_,
'''-'

;

r

j Strongly !
; Agree

--

i !

'-•
:J

a

-

v

--

;--.
,.; t
'••-''

-:

i;---:

<;"••-.

'•

^
*--'

'•'

17. is there anything you would like to say about Katrina and USM's response to the hurricane, that has not been included in
this survey? If so, please do so here.

100%

Finish
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APPENDIX D
QUANTITATIVE DATA

Table Al
Perceptions of Information Adequacy One Week Prior to Katrina with Information
Sources
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

(%)
Yes

(%)
No

(%)
Yes

(%)
No

(%)
Yes

(%)
No

(%)
Yes

(%)
No

(%)
Yes

(%)
No

.04
29

.08
6

6.1
41

8.3
56

6.2
42

5.6
38

9.4
63

8.3
56

10.0
68

. Web

2.0
13

10.7
72

4.0
27

10.4
70

3.4
23

8.5
57

5.9
0

11.8
79

Dept
Mtg.

1.3
9

11.3
76

1.6
11

12.8
86

2.5
17

9.6
63

4.3
29

Dept
memo

0.7
5

11.9
80

1.1
8

13.3
89

1.1
8

10.7
72

2.6
18

TV

2.0
14

9.7
65

4.3
29

10.0
68

4.1
28

8.6
52

Radio

2.0
14

10.6
71

1.9
13

12.5
84

1.9
13

10.0
67

Paper

1.0
7

11.6
78

2.2
15

12.2
82

2.3
16

9.5
64

11
74

0.8
6

13.6
91

1.0
7

10.9
73

1.0
7

13.4
90

6.4
43

7.3
49

7.1
48

Email

Land
phone

1.6
11

Cell

1.7
12

Info,
coworker
Other

6.2
42

Agiree

Strongly
Agree

(%)
No

(%)
Yes

(%)
No

5.3
36

(%)
Yes
22.4
150

14.2
95

6.1
41

4.1
28

4.1
28

5.9
40

10.4
70

11.9
80

4.3
29

5.9
40

13.4
90

2.0
14

2.0
54

8.0
54

14.3
96

4.1
28

6.1
41

15.1
101

1.0
7

9.1
61

3.7
25

18.7
125

2.2
15

8.0
54

6.5
44

11.2
75

3.8
26

6.2
42

9.1
61

13.3
89

5.8
38

4.4
30

4.6
31

13.1
88

1.7
12

8.3
56

6.2
42

16.1
108

3.8
26

6.4
43

3.5
24

14.2
95

1.4
10

8.6
58

5.0
34

17.3
116

2.0
14

8.2
55

10.9
73

2.6
18

15.1
101

1.0
7

9.1
61

5.0
16

20.0
134

1.9
13

8.3
56

1.1
8

10.7
72

2.6
18

15.1
101

1.0
7

9.1
61

5.0
34

17.3
116

2.0
14

8.2
55

6.1
40

6.1
40

10.0
67

7.7
52

5.2
35

4.9
33

12.4
83

10.0
67

6.4
43

3.8
26

Table A2
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy One Week Prior to Katrina with Number of
Years of Employment
Strongly
Disagree
N (%)
<2yrs

Disagree
N (%)

Somewhat
Disagree
N (%)

Neutral
N (%)

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)

Agree
N (%)

Strongly
Agree
N (%)

Total

2
(20%)

3
(30%)

0
(0%)

2
(20%)

1
(10%)

1
(10%)

1
(10%)

10

45
(12.7%)

49
(13.8%)

51
(14.4%)

72
(20.3%)

37
(10.4%)

76
(21.4%)

25
(7.0%)

355

25
(14.1%)

31
(17.5%)

18
(10.2%)

28
(15.8%)

15
(8.5%)

42
(23.7%)

18
(10.25)

yrS

7
(10.4%)

10
(14.9%)

6
(9%)

9
(13.4%)

7
(10.4%)

17
(25.4%)

11
(16.4%)

67

yrS

5
(14.7%)

2
(5.9%)

4
(11.8%)

7
(20.6%)

4
(11.8%)

9
(26.5%)

3
(8.8%)

34

0
(0%)

1
(25%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

1
(25%)

2
(50%)

3-11
yrS

12-20
yrS

21-79

39yrS

Note: N = 647
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Table A3
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy One Week Prior to Katrina with Employee
Work Location
Strongly
Disagree
N (%)

Disagree

64
(13.0%)

72
(14.6%)

Hattiesburg

Gulf Coast
Research

N (%)

3

Research

^

2%)

Somewhat
Disagree
N (%)

Neutral

61
(12.4%)

84
(17.0%)

4

^

g%)

5
(g6%)

N (%)

12

^0.1%)

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)
54
(11.0%)

8

(13.8%)

Agree
N (%)
114
(23.1%)

15

(25.9%)

Strongly
Agree
N (%)
44
(8.9%)

Total

493

11

(19.0%)

Long
Beach/
f U !f Park/
Co/

15
(16.5%)

19
(20.9%)

10
(11.0%)

15
(16.5%)

5
(5.5%)

17
(18.7%)

10
(11.0%)

3
(13.0%)

2
(8.7%)

4
(17.4%)

6
(26.1%)

1
(4.3%)

3
(13.0%)

4
(17.4%)

Kessler
AFB

lteXmiS
Center

.,

Note: N = 665

Table A4
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy One Week Prior to Katrina with Employee
Pay Type

Monthly
Paycheck

W

Strongly
Disagree
N (%)

Disagree

16
(8.9%)

22
(12.2%)

Neutral

22
(12:2%)

26
(14.4%)

N (%)

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)
24
(13.3%)

Agree
N (%)

Strongly
Agree
N (%)

46
(25.6%)

24
(13.3%)

6 9

7 4

57

93

4 4

103

4 5

(14 2%)

(15 3%)

(1L8%)

(19 25)

(9 1%)

(2L7%)

(L3%)

M

Paycheck

N (%)

Somewhat
Disagree
N (%)

Note: N = 665

-

'

'

-

Total

48S
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Table A5
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Job Security up to One Month after
Katrina with Number of Years of Employment
Strongly
Disagree
N (%)

Disagree

N (%)

Strongly
Agree
N (%)

0
(0%)

1
(11.1%)

2
(22.2%)

3
(33.3%)

311
yrs

34
(8.8%)

28
(7.3%)

113
(29.5%)

103
(26.9%)

11
(2.8%)

383
(54.9%)

13
(6.8%)

20
(10.5%)

21
(11%)

49
(25.9%)

58
(30.6%)

2
(1%)

189
(27.1%)

9
(11.5%)

5
(6.4%)

5
(6.4%)

7
(8.9%)

25
(32%)

22
(28.2%)

2
(2.5%)

78
(11.2%)

2
(5.8%)

3
(8.8%)

0
(0%)

4
(11.7%)

1
(2.9%)

16
(47%)

7
(20.5%)

1
(2.9%)

34
(4.9%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

1
(20%)

0
(0%)

1
(20%)

3
(60%)

0
(0%)

5
(.7%)

Somewhat
Disagree
N (%)

Neutral

1
(11.1%)

0
(0%)

1
(11.1%)

27
(7%)

43
(11.2%)

24
(6.2%)

1220
yrs

8
(4.23)

18
(9.5%)

2129
yrs

3
(3.8%)

3038
yrs

39
yrs
+

< 2
yrS

Note: N = 698

N (%)

N (%)

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)

Agree

Can't
Recall
N (%)

Total

9
(1.3%)
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Table A6
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Job Security up to One Month after
Katrina with Employee Work Location
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neutral Somewhat
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
N (%)
N(%)
N(%)
N(%)
N(%)
Hattiesburg

GulfCoast
Research
Lab
Long
Beach/
GulfPark/
Jackson
Co./
Kessler
AFB

31
62
(5.8%) (11.5%)

36
56
(6.7%) (10.4%)

2
(3.49%)

3
(5.175)

6
(6.25%)

9
(9.3%)

5
(5.2%)

5
(5.2%)

2
(8-3o/o)

2
( 83 o /o )

1
(4-1o/o)

4
( 66 o /o )

Stennis
Space
Center

156
(29.1%)

0
4
(0%) (6.89%)

Agree
N (%)

Strongly Can't
Agree Recall
N (%) N (%)

Total

44
• 138 •
14
537
(8.2%) (25.7%) (2.6%) (75.1%)

5
21
23
(8.62%) (36.205) (39.7%)

0
(0%)

58
(8.1%)

8
22
40
1
96
(8.33%) (22.9%) (41.6%) (1.04%) (13.4%)

0
13
(9o/o) (54.10/^

2
( 8 3o/o)

0
(Q0/O)

24
(3

4 O /O)

Note: N = 715

Table A7
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Job Security up to One Month after
Katrina with Employee Pay Type
Strongly Disagree Somewhat
Disagree
Disagree
N(%)
N(%)
N(%)
Monthly
Paycheck

22
(8.0%)

?!" , .
Pacheck

(43%)

30
(10.9%)

19

Note: N = 718

46
)

10 43%

( -

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree
N(%)

N(%)

13
29
(4.72%) (10.5%)

29
( - )
6 6%

Agree
N(%)

27
83
(9.8%) (30.1%)

40
( - )

Strongly
Agree
N(%)

Can't
Recall
N (%)

Total

69
3
276'
(25.0%) (1.1%) (38.4%)

32
129
134
13
442
(7-21%) (29.2%) (30.3%) (2.9%) (61.6%)

9 0%

'

~~
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Table A8
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Paycheck Retrieval up to One
Month after Katrina with Number of Years of Employment

1
(11.1%)

2
(22.2%)

0
(0%)

2
(22.2%)

0
(0%)

26
(6.7%0

29
(7.5%)

30
(7.8%)

38
(9.8%)

24
(6.2%)

119
(30.9%)

96
(25%)

22
(5.7%)

383
(54.9%)

l2

6
(3.1%)

15
(7.9%)

18
(9.5%)

20
(10.5%)

12
(6.3%)

67
(35.4%)

51
(26.9%)

10
(5.2%)

189
(27.1%)

2l

3
(8.8%)

6
(7.6%)

3
(3.8%)

6
(7.6%)

7
(8.9%)

23
(29.4%)

19
(24.3%)

11
(14%)

78
(11.2%)

2
(5.8%)

3
(8.8%)

0
(0%)

3
(8.8%)

2
(5.8%)

13
(38.2%)

8
(23.5%)

3
(8.8%0

34
(4.9%)

0

0
(0%)

1
(20%)

(0%)

0
(0%)

~

~

Q
9

30

~

38

39

^s

0
(0%)

Note: N = 698

(0%)

N (%)

Agree

Total

1
(11.1%)

3

0
(0%)

N (%)

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)

Can't
Recall
N (%)

Neutral

yrs

Disagree

Strongly
Agree
N (%)

Somewhat
Disagree
N (%)

< 2

Strongly
Disagree
N (%)

N (%)

9
(1.3%)

0
3
1
(60%) (20%)

5
(.7%)
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Table A9
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Paycheck Retrieval up to One
Month after Katrina with Employee Work Location
Strongly Disagree Somewhat
Disagree
Disagree
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)
28

Hattiesbure

43

s

(5.2%)

(8.0%)

Gulf Coast
Research
Lab

3
(5.17%)

34

Neutral
N (%)
56

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)
29

Agree
N (%)
181

Strongly
Agree
N (%)
126

Can't
Recall
N (%)
41

Total

538

(6.31%) (10.4%)

(5.4%) (33.6%)

(23.4%)

1
(1.72%)

1
(1.72%)

4
(6.895)

5
20
(5.2%) (34.4%)

23
1
(39.6%) (1.72%)

7
(7.3%)

5
(5.2%)

10
(10.4%)

5
(5.2%)

8
(8.3%)

26
(27%)

31
(33.2%)

4
96
(4.1%) (13.4%)

Stennis
3
Space
(12.5)
Center
Note: N = 716

0
(0%)

2
10
(8.3%) (41.6%)

3
(12.5%)

1
(4.1%)

Long
Beach/
GulfPark/
Jackson
Co./
Kessler
AFB

2
3
(8.3%) (12.5%)

(7.6%) (75.1%)
58
(8.1%)

24
(3.4%)

Table A10
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Paycheck Retrieval up to One
Month after Katrina with Employee Pay Type
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neutral
Disagree
Disagree
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)
Monthly
Paycheck

23
(8.3%)

25
(9.1%)

Bi

16
( 36 o /o )

( 6 5o/o)

"
Weekly
Paycheck

Note: N = 719

29

10
28
(3.6%) (10.2%)

32
( 7 2 %)

43
(9.7%)

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)

Agree
N (%)

23
88
(8.3%) (31.9%)

Strongly
Agree
N (%)

Can't
Recall
N (%)

Total

61
18
276
(22.0%) (16.5%) (38.4%)

22
149
122
30
443
(5.0%) (33.6%) (27.5%) (6.89%) (61.6%)

Table A l l
Crosstabulation
of Information Adequacy Regarding Return-to-Work
Month after Katrina with Number of Years of Employment
Strongly Disagree Somewhat
Disagree
Disagree
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)
<2

Neutral
N (%)

Somewhat
Agree
N (%)

Agree
N (%)

Date up to One

Strongly
Agree
N (%)

1
(11.1%)

1
(11.1%)

1
1
(11.1%) (11.1%)

1
2
(11.1%) (22.2%)

2
(22.2%)

311
yrs

32
(8.3%)

38
(9.8%)

23
24
(5.9%) (6.25%)

44
120
(11.4%) (31.2%)

100
(26%)

1220
yrs

13
(6.9%)

11
(5.8%)

12
(6.4%)

9
(4.8%)

21
65
(11.2%) (34.7%)

2129
yrs

3
(3.8%0

5
(6.4%)

5
(6.4%)

3
(3.8%)

9
66
(11.5%) (84.6%)

3038
yrs

2
(5.8%)

2
(5.8%)

1
(2.9%)

1
(2.9%)

1
(2.9%)

19
55.8%)

8
(23.5%)

39
yrs

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

(0%)

0
(0%0

0
(100%)

yrs

Note: N = 697

0
(0%)

Can't
Recall
N (%)

Total

0
(0%)

9
(1.3%)

3
384
(.7%) (55.1%)

65
55
187
(34.7%) (29.4%0 (26.8%)

26
(33%)

0
78
(0%) (11.2%)

0
(0%)

5

34
(4.9%)

0
(0%)

5
(.7%)
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Table A12
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Return-to-Work Date up to One
Month after Katrina with Employee Work Location
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)

Strongly Can't
Agree Recall
N (%) N (%)

Total

Hattiesburg

35
(6.5%)

33
(6.2%)

43
32
(8.0%) (6.0%)

59
184
147
(11.2%) (34.4%) (27.5%)

2
535
(.4%) (75.0%)

GulfCoast
Research
Lab

3
(5.2%)

2
(3.4%)

3
3
(5.2%) (5.2%)

4
22
21
(6.9%) (37.9%) (36.2%)

0
58
(0%) (8.1%)

10
12
(10.4%) (12.5%)

6
2
(6.3%) (2.08%)

Long
Beach/
Gulf Park/
Jackson
Co./
Kessler
AFB

Stennis
4
Space
(16.7%)
Center
Note: N = 713

1
(4.2%)

0
3
(0%) (12.6%)

11
22
31
2
96
(11.5%) (22.9%) (32.3%) (20.8%) (13.4%)

1
11
4
(4.2%) (45.8%) (16.7%)

0
24
(0%) (3.4%)

Table A l 3
Crosstabulation of Information Adequacy Regarding Return-to-Work Date up to One
Month after Katrina with Employee Pay Type
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neutral Somewhat
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
N(%)
N(%)
N(%)
N(%)
N(%)

Monthly
Paycheck

26
(9.4%)

24
(8.7%)

17
12
(6.2%) (4.3%)

Bi26
Weekly
(5.9%)
Paycheck
Note: N = 716

34
( 7 . 7 o /o)

(57o/o)

25

29
( 6 6 o /o)

Agree
N(%)

Strongly Can't
Agree Recall
N (%) N (%)

Total

31
88
77
1
276
(11.2%) (31.9%) (27.9%) (.4%) (38.5%)

46
152
126
3
440
(10.5%) (34.5%) (28.6%) (.7%) (61.5%)
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Table A14
High Reliability Organization Scale Frequency Distribution
Frequency

10
11
14
19
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
70
Total

1
1
1
1
2
4
1
3
2
2
1
6
2
6
6
10
7
7
8
16
11
19
15
30
11
21
24
22
23
18
23
28
27
28
24
20
32
20
25
23
12
21
14
18
7
4
7
8
6
1
1
1
2
633

Percent (%)

.2
.2
.2
.2
.3
.6
.2
.5
.3
.3
.2
.9
.3
.9
.9
1.6
1.1
1.1
1.3
2.5
1.7
3.0
2.4
4.7
1.7
3.3
3.8
3.5
3.6
2.8
3.6
4.4
4.3
4.4
3.8
3.2
5.1
3.2
3.9
3.6
1.9
3.3
2.2
2.8
1.1
.6
1.1
1.3
.9
.2
.2
.2
.3
100

Table Al 5
Crosstabulation of High Reliability Organization Ranges with Range of Years of
Employment
<2yrs

3-11 yrs

12-20 yrs

21-29 yrs

30-38 yrs

39yrs+

Total

Very Low (10-24)

0

8

4

0

1

0

13

Low (25-39)

1

72

30

12

4

0

119

High (41-55)

2

182

99

37

21

2

343

Very High (56-70)

5

75

36

20

6

1

143

Total

8

337

169

69

32

3

618

Table A16
Crosstabulation of High Reliability Organization Ranges with Employee Work Location
1
2
3
4
Total
Very Low (10-24)

13

0

0

1

14

Low (25-39)

92

9

19

3

123

High (41-55)

266

33

40

9

348

Very High (56-70)

101

13

22

9

145

Total

472

55

81

22

630

Note:

1 = Hattiesburg
2 = Gulf Coast Research Laboratory
3 = Long Beach/Gulf Park/Jackson Co./Keesler AFB
4 = Stennis Space Center

Table A17
Crosstabulation of High Reliability Organization Ranges with Employee Pay Type
Monthly

Bi-Weekly

Total

Very Low (10-24)

4

10

14

Low (25-39)

32

91

123

High (41-55)

87

262

349

Very High (56-70)

34

111

145

Total

157

474

631
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